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ARTICLES
LOSS OF SELF-CONTROL, DUAL-PROCESS
THEORIES, AND PROVOCATION
Michal Buchhandler-Raphael*
Contemporary understanding of the provocation defense views the “loss
of self-control” theory as the cornerstone of this partial excuse. In
considering whether to reduce murder charges to manslaughter, juries and
judges rely on this theory to determine if the defendant lost self-control after
experiencing intense emotional arousal and if a reasonable person would
have also likely lost self-control in similar circumstances.
This Article questions this conventional wisdom by examining the various
flaws embedded in provocation’s loss of self-control theory. It argues that
the theory is both over- and underinclusive. It is overinclusive because it
provides a basis for mitigation in cases where leniency is normatively
unwarranted given policy considerations. It is also underinclusive because
it only accommodates the typical reactions of angry defendants who manifest
sudden impulsivity. It fails to help defendants who visibly appear calm and
composed because their emotional arousal was triggered by a host of other
emotions beyond anger—mostly fear, desperation, and hopelessness.
This Article turns to psychological research on dual-process models to
craft an alternative theory underlying the provocation defense. Drawing on
these models’ two modes of thinking, it contends that provoked killers’
reactions may be understood as the result of emotions that shape actors’
judgment and decision-making processes. The Article uses the term
“impaired judgment” to refer to these situations. Acknowledging both the
promises and the pitfalls of this alternate theory, the Article advances two
arguments. First, it posits that the concept of impaired judgment is better
suited than loss of self-control to support provocation’s doctrinal framework.
Second, it points to intrinsic limitations embedded in reliance on the loss of
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self-control theory, which is unable to account for provocation’s normative
dimension. The theory must therefore be supplemented with a value-based
component that would assist juries in determining the circumstances that
make provocation adequate from a normative and evaluative perspective.
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INTRODUCTION
On the night of July 31, 2012, thirty-one-year-old Rebekah Mellon was
sitting on a couch in the living room of her Phoenix home, smoking a
cigarette and calmly watching her husband Donald Mellon taking his final
breaths.1 Surveillance cameras installed in the house showed that, for
twenty-three minutes, Rebekah witnessed Donald dying as he lay on the floor
after she had shot him in the head.2 The footage showed that at the time of
the shooting, Donald was talking on the phone as Rebekah obtained a
handgun from a cabinet, aimed it at him, and, after a short verbal argument,

1. Richard Ruelas, What Made This Woman Shoot Her Husband Dead?, ARIZ. REPUBLIC
(Jan. 3, 2017, 8:17 AM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/phoenix-best-reads/
2017/01/03/phoenix-woman-rebekah-mellon-shoot-her-husband-dead/92732054/
[https://
perma.cc/URZ3-3NUD].
2. Id. The defendant, Rebekah, stated that the deceased installed security cameras in the
home because he wanted to watch her whereabouts at all times. Prosecutors disputed this
account, saying that the deceased installed the cameras after their former house was
burglarized. Id.
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shot him.3 It further showed that Donald was unarmed and that no physical
altercation between him and Rebekah preceded the shooting.4
The same surveillance cameras captured not only the shooting itself and
the subsequent chilling episode but also some of the events that transpired
before the day of the fatal incident, including Donald’s multiple physical
abuses of Rebekah.5 Rebekah claimed that during the course of seven years
of marriage, she was a victim of domestic violence.6 She said Donald would
get drunk, throw her on the ground, and choke her and that the abuse had
further escalated over the years.7 Rebekah also said Donald constantly
exhibited controlling behavior, and when she tried to leave him, he “shot her
iPod, broke her phone, and locked her inside the home.”8 Some incidents of
physical abuse were also documented in police reports.9 Rebekah was
initially charged with first-degree murder.10 Pursuant to a plea agreement,
she pleaded guilty to second-degree murder.11 The judge accepted the plea
and sentenced her to twenty years in prison.12
Now consider how the case would have played out had it gone to trial. The
defense’s theory would have likely been that the defendant had shot the
deceased because she had feared that he would have killed her. Based on the
deceased’s prolonged physical abuse of the defendant, the defense would
have likely requested that the jury be instructed on self-defense. The jury,
however, would have likely rejected this claim because surveillance footage
shows that, at the time of the shooting, the deceased presented no danger to
the defendant and therefore her use of deadly force against the deceased was
not immediately necessary.13
The defense attorney would have also likely requested the court to instruct
the jury on manslaughter on the theory that the deceased’s behavior provoked
3. See id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. For example, in 2011, police arrived at their residence after someone had pushed the
panic button. Id. Mouthing the words “help me” to the police officer who interviewed her,
Rebekah told him that the deceased threatened, intimidated, and physically abused her on a
daily basis. Id. But when police informed the defendant that they had arrested the deceased
on assault charges, she became upset and said, “He is gonna kill me.” Id.
10. See Richard Ruelas, Sentencing Set for Woman Who Shot Husband, Smoked While He
Died, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Jan. 11, 2017, 12:11 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/
local/phoenix-breaking/2017/01/11/rebekah-mellon-phoenix-woman-who-shot-her-husbandand-smoked-while-he-died-pleads-guilty/96450378/ [https://perma.cc/4ETY-RTWY].
11. Id. In a memorandum filed with the court, Mellon’s defense attorney said that, if the
case had gone to trial, she would have argued self-defense as she feared for her life because
of the prolonged physical abuse by the deceased. Id.
12. Press Release, Maricopa Cty. Att’y’s Office, Rebekah Mellon Pled to 2nd Degree
Murder for Shooting Her Husband in 2012 (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.maricopacounty
attorney.org/CivicAlerts.aspx?AID=426 [https://perma.cc/P9LG-4QHM].
13. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-404 (2020) (“A person is justified in threatening or using
physical force against another when and to the extent a reasonable person would believe that
physical force is immediately necessary . . . .”).
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the defendant. A provocation defense, however, would not have fared better
given the circumstances underlying the shooting. In Arizona, a seconddegree murder may be mitigated to manslaughter if the defendant committed
the killing “upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion resulting from adequate
provocation by the victim.”14 But the statute further defines “adequate
provocation” as “conduct or circumstances sufficient to deprive a reasonable
person of self-control.”15 Consequently, Arizona courts require defendants
to introduce evidence that the deceased’s provoking behavior caused them to
lose self-control.16 The court would have likely refused to instruct the jury
on manslaughter, reasoning that the footage documenting the defendant’s
actions demonstrated that she acted with complete self-control. Far from
appearing distraught, emotionally overwrought, or hysterical, the defendant’s
behavior was seemingly the epitome of a woman who maintained selfcontrol.17 The court would have likely placed a premium on the fact that, at
the time of the killing, the defendant appeared neither visibly angry nor
fearful and that she had maintained her composure before, during, and after
the shooting. The court would have likely stressed that the footage supported
the inference that the homicide was motivated by the defendant’s desire for
revenge against the deceased, namely, a calculated retaliatory act following
prolonged physical abuse.
Given the insurmountable difficulties in establishing a mitigating defense,
the defendant’s decision to plead guilty to second-degree murder, rather than
risk a trial in which the jury would have been exposed to the graphic images
of the shooting and its aftermath, arguably seemed like a sound defense
strategy. While jurors might offer leniency to defendants whom they
perceive as abuse victims who suddenly lost self-control, Rebekah Mellon
seems a far cry from this case and therefore, an unlikely candidate for
compassion.
Arizona is not alone in its insistence that provocation must result in the
defendant’s loss of self-control. Contemporary understanding of the
provocation defense is mostly grounded on the theory that defendants kill
14. Id. § 13-1103(A)(2).
15. Id. § 13-1101(4).
16. See, e.g., State v. Roberson, No. 2 CA–CR 2011–0224, 2012 WL 3061644, at *2–3
(Ariz. Ct. App. July 27, 2012) (rejecting the defendant’s claims that he had been provoked by
the deceased and holding that his defense was inconsistent with the finding that he had been
provoked by the deceased such that a reasonable person in his situation would have been
deprived of self-control); State v. Hernandez, No. 2 CA–CR 2009–0232, 2010 WL 3341283,
at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2010) (The defendant had not introduced any evidence
demonstrating that the deceased’s actions provoked him, causing him to lose his self-control
and shoot the deceased. Instead, the record showed that he acted rationally and with purpose.
The court stressed that the defendant’s own testimony indicated that he claimed that he was
scared of the deceased, tried to get away from him, shot out of fear to defend himself, which
is incompatible with a provocation claim.).
17. Courts take into consideration not only the defendant’s behavior at the time of the
killing but also behavior following the killing itself. See, e.g., State v. Bernhardt, 372 P.3d
1161, 1174 (Kan. 2016) (citing evidence that even if, at the time of the killing, the defendant’s
behavior was impulsive, the defendant’s behavior after the killing appeared cold and callous
rather than impulsive).
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after suddenly losing self-control, immediately after being provoked by the
deceased.18 Common law has long recognized that murder charges may be
mitigated to voluntary manslaughter if there is evidence that the defendant
acted in a sudden heat of passion, stemming from adequate provocation,
without an opportunity to cool off.19 Admittedly, traditional provocation
doctrine did not make the defendant’s loss of self-control an element of the
defense.20 Conceptualization of the defense, however, has significantly
evolved over the years, shifting the emphasis from provocation’s adequacy
towards the defendant’s loss of self-control.21 Even jurisdictions that did not
adopt a reformulated version of provocation, such as the defense of extreme
mental and emotional disturbance (EMED), incorporated the notion of loss
of self-control into one of the defense’s requirements, largely by stating,
legislatively or judicially, that provocation is adequate when a reasonable
person would have similarly lost self-control.22
Today, loss of self-control is commonly perceived as the cornerstone of
the modern provocation defense.23 This concept not only captures
provocation’s key requirement and its underlying rationale but is also
consistent with provoked killers’ own narratives and with the behavioral
manifestations that judges and juries expect to find in such defendants.
Likewise, the image of an “out of control” perpetrator dominates both the
criminal law and the public’s imagination. To name just a couple examples
demonstrating the ways that this vision is reinforced in popular culture,
consider the popularity of true crime documentary-style series like Snapped
and Deadly Women, which largely focus on female killers who killed
intimate partners after allegedly losing self-control.24
This Article casts doubt on the criminal justice system’s characterization
of provocation as grounded in the loss of self-control theory by examining
the various flaws in this account. Case law illustrates that the theory is not
only vague and unhelpful but also confusing and misleading.25 The concept
of loss of self-control is overly broad because most crimes may fairly be
characterized as resulting from control failures and most criminal defendants
may plausibly be viewed as “out of control.”26 The concept is thus merely
descriptive, lacking any normative component that is capable of drawing the
boundary between defendants deserving of murder convictions and less
culpable defendants who should be convicted of lesser crimes.27 The concept
18. See infra Part I.
19. See infra Part I.
20. See infra Part I.
21. See infra Part I.
22. See infra Part I.
23. See Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation
Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1340 (1997).
24. See generally Deadly Women (Discovery Channel television broadcast 2005);
Snapped (Oxygen television broadcast 2004).
25. See infra Parts II.A–B.
26. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Crime, Punishment, and the Psychology of SelfControl, 61 EMORY L.J. 501, 505 (2012).
27. Id. at 519.
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is also indiscriminate because it is unable to provide decision makers with
any operational guidelines on which types of control failures warrant
mitigation.
Given these shortcomings, courts’ reliance on the loss of self-control
theory as the basis of provocation has resulted in a defense that is both overand underinclusive. Feminist scholars denounce the defense on the grounds
that it is overinclusive to the detriment of female victims because it gives jury
instructions on manslaughter for men who kill their female intimate partners
attempting to terminate the relationship.28 Emphasizing defendants’ loss of
self-control thus results in bringing provocation claims before juries in
But
circumstances where mitigation is normatively unjustified.29
commentators’ hostility towards provocation claims that are grounded in loss
of self-control, especially in their perception that it harms women, impedes
any doctrinal developments, including the advancement of an alternative
construct that would also benefit female defendants.30
One of the upshots of the pervasive critique that the provocation doctrine
is overinclusive is that commentators fail to recognize that the defense may
also prove underinclusive in cases where overwhelming emotions other than
anger, mostly fear and desperation, triggered the provocation.31 Specifically,
defendants who overreacted to the deceaseds’ physical threats often do not
receive jury instructions on manslaughter because their reactions do not
visibly appear to result from a sudden loss of self-control.32 In fact, fearful
killers may seem to possess self-control, erroneously making the homicide
look like a cold, premeditated, and deliberate act of calculated revenge rather
than an impulsive loss of self-control.33 The loss of self-control requirement
thus accommodates mostly defendants who manifest behavior characterized
as acting “out of control,” but it is not responsive to many provoked killers,
including women, who instead appear calm, composed, and in control. While
mitigation might have been normatively warranted, the latter defendants are
denied jury instructions on manslaughter.34 In short, provocation’s loss of
self-control theory, initially lauded as a promising overhaul of an archaic
defense, has collapsed, leaving the defense on shaky doctrinal grounds.
This Article proposes a remedy to the drawbacks stemming from
provocation laws’ reliance on loss of self-control theory by considering the
alternative theory of impaired judgment to support the conceptual foundation
of the defense. Professor Stephen Morse has long rejected the notion of loss
of self-control, suggesting instead that the criminal law should adopt a
generic excuse of partial responsibility that would be grounded in the concept

28. See infra Part II.A.
29. See infra Part II.A.
30. See Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Fear-Based Provocation, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1719,
1737 (2018).
31. See infra Part II.B.
32. See infra Part II.B.
33. See infra Part II.B.
34. See infra Part II.B.
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of diminished rationality and applicable to all crimes.35 But this alternative
notion of diminished rationality suffers from conceptual shortcomings that
make it an inadequate conceptual framework for underlying the provocation
defense.36 Here, this Article partially draws on Morse’s ideas by arguing that
the provocation defense indeed should not be grounded in the concept of loss
of self-control. Yet, it disagrees with Morse’s suggestion that the defense is
best understood as grounded in the theory of diminished rationality. Instead,
the provocation defense ought to be grounded in the notion of impaired
judgment, by drawing on psychological research that conceptualizes
provocation as one instance of impaired judgment.37
In recent years, legal scholars began delving into the implications of
psychological studies on reshaping the scope of criminal responsibility,
including revisiting the contours of the provocation defense.38 For example,
commentators consider the insights that psychological research on control
failures may offer for criminal law theory and doctrine in general and its
implications for the scope of the provocation defense in particular.39 This
Article accepts commentators’ invitation to consider psychological research
for the purpose of reconstructing the provocation defense in accordance with
empirical evidence but departs from its conclusion that criminal law doctrine
should draw on the psychological concept of self-control. Instead, this
Article considers the ways in which a myriad of intense emotions, including
anger and fear, might impair individuals’ judgment. In turn, this might also
result in lethal aggression, as supported by psychological research on
judgment and decision-making, particularly dual-process theories.
Cognitive psychologists developed dual-process theories to explain two
ways of thinking: one is fast, intuitive, emotional, and irrational, and the
other slow, deliberate, and rational.40 These theories define diminished
rationality as a shortfall in behavior compared to fully instrumental
rationality.41 While dual-process theories initially developed to explain
economic behavior, they carry extensive ramifications for various other
areas. Criminal law scholars, however, have yet to consider the significance
of these theories for the scope of criminal responsibility in general and for
rethinking excuse defenses, such as provocation, in particular.
This Article considers the implications of psychological research on the
provocation defense by making two key arguments. First, it posits that the
notion of impaired judgment offers a broad-based doctrinal framework for
provocation and should therefore replace the misguided loss of self-control
35. See Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 289, 296–97 (2003).
36. See infra Parts III.B–C.
37. See infra Part III.C.
38. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 26, at 530–31.
39. Id. at 525–26.
40. See infra Part III.A.
41. See Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, Constitutional Law and Economics, in
RESEARCH METHODS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A HANDBOOK (Malcolm Langford & David
S. Law eds., forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 4), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3123253 [https://perma.cc/2M5R-EW64].
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paradigm that currently underpins provocation laws. Grounding provocation
claims in the concept of impaired judgment would extend the defense to
different types of defendants that the loss of self-control theory fails to help,
including fearful killers like Rebekah Mellon.42 Second, the Article argues
that, while the advantages of such psychological research are invaluable, it
has some intrinsic limits for the purpose of revisiting provocation’s scope.
Provocation’s adequacy element calls for normative evaluations, which rest
on a combination of policy considerations, communities’ shared values,
contemporary cultural norms, and moral principles rather than on
empiricism.43 While dual-process theories support provocation’s subjective
prong, that is, the defendant’s extreme emotional arousal, they are unable to
offer any insights for shaping provocation’s objective component, namely its
normative dimension. A reformulated provocation defense, which is
grounded in the notion of impaired judgment, must incorporate some valuebased elements to direct decision makers’ inquiries into the normative
question of who among defendants deserve mitigation. Specifically,
defendants do not deserve to be stigmatized and punished as murderers when
they were provoked by the deceased’s wrongful act.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I outlines the role that the loss of
self-control theory currently plays in underpinning modern understanding of
the provocation defense as reflected in scholarly writings and courts’
decisions. Part II elaborates on the pitfalls of provocation’s loss of selfcontrol theory, which result in a defense that is both over- and underinclusive.
Drawing on an analogy to the widespread rejection of loss of self-control
theory in the insanity defense area, this Part further posits that this theory
should similarly be dismissed in the provocation context. Part III examines
the concept of impaired judgment as an alternative to the loss of self-control
theory. It begins with a general discussion of psychological research on dualprocess theories, then contemplates its implications for the provocation
defense. Part IV first acknowledges the intrinsic limits of psychological
research for deciding what types of defendants whose decision-making and
judgment processes have been impaired might deserve mitigation. Next, it
considers the addition of a policy-based component that would assist juries
in determining the circumstances that make provocation adequate from a
normative perspective.
I. LOSS OF SELF-CONTROL THEORY UNDER EXISTING LAW
Grounded in a retributivist position of “just desert,” the rationale
underlying the provocation defense is that provoked actors kill because they
lose self-control.44 It is the loss of self-control that makes them less morally
42. See supra text accompanying notes 1–12.
43. See Morse, supra note 35, at 299 nn.21–22 (contending that normative judgments
should be made by jurors at the guilt phase rather than by judges at sentencing).
44. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Desert, Punishment, and Criminal Responsibility, 49 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 71 (1986) (discussing the retributivist theory of punishment and the role
of the victim’s guilt in provocation as a basis for reduced sentence).
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culpable than unprovoked killers and thus deserving of reduced
punishment.45 This position implicitly acknowledges the actor’s motive for
the crime because it assumes that people who kill in response to provocation
by the deceased have a less blameworthy motive than those killing for other
motives, such as greed or revenge.46 The defendant’s loss of self-control is
perceived as a somewhat understandable motive compared to, for example,
killing motivated by revenge, which modern societal values denounce as
deplorable.47
Existing provocation laws significantly vary by jurisdiction, making it
difficult to generalize about the defense’s precise elements. Broadly
speaking, a majority of jurisdictions retain the essence of common law’s
“heat of passion” defense.48 In these jurisdictions, murder charges are
typically mitigated to voluntary manslaughter when three requirements are
met: (1) a subjective prong requires that the defendant kill while in a sudden
heat of passion; (2) an objective prong requires that the passion was the result
of adequate provocation; and (3) the defendant did not have an opportunity
to cool off.49
At first blush, current formulations that draw on the traditional provocation
defense do not explicitly adopt any language requiring proof that the
provoked actor had lost self-control.50 The loss of self-control requirement,
however, is deeply embedded in the defense in various ways. The concept
of loss of self-control is often used by courts when explaining the test to
determine when provocation is sufficiently severe and objectively
reasonable.51 Courts hold that provocation is adequate only when a
45. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 530–41 (7th ed. 2016).
46. See Douglas Husak, “Broad” Culpability and the Retributivist Dream, 9 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 449, 475–76 (2012).
47. See Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter, Men Who
Kill, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 71, 104–05 (1992) (noting that a retaliatory killing
is antithetical to the doctrinal understanding of voluntary manslaughter and that revenge
killings are marked by cool calculation as opposed to hot-blooded killing).
48. DRESSLER, supra note 45, at 530.
49. Id. (nothing that, additionally, there must be a causal link between the provocation,
the passion, and the killing). This Article uses the terms “manslaughter” and “voluntary
manslaughter” interchangeably as jurisdictions that amended their penal codes use the term
“manslaughter,” while jurisdictions that retain the traditional common-law offense use the
term “voluntary manslaughter.”
50. Some jurisdictions that do not use loss of self-control language rely instead on the
concept of “irresistible passion.” See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-2(a) (2020) (“A person
commits the offense of voluntary manslaughter when he causes the death of another human
being under circumstances which would otherwise be murder and if he acts solely as the result
of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to
excite such passion in a reasonable person; however, if there should have been an interval
between the provocation and the killing sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity to be
heard, of which the jury in all cases shall be the judge, the killing shall be attributed to
deliberate revenge and be punished as murder.”). A plausible argument could be made that
the irresistible passion and loss of self-control are synonymous concepts in this context, as
defendants who could not resist their impulse to kill necessarily lost their ability to exercise
self-control.
51. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5404(a)(1) (2020) (“Voluntary manslaughter is
knowingly killing a human being committed upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of
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reasonable or ordinary person would have similarly lost control as a result of
the provocation.52 Other times, the loss of self-control theory is integrated
into jury instructions on manslaughter, explaining that inadequate
provocation is one that would not have caused a reasonable person to have
lost self-control.53 Still, other jurisdictions incorporate the loss of selfcontrol theory into the cooling-off requirement, for example, by stating that
the defendant must have killed before there was an interval between the
provocation and the killing in which a person of ordinary reason and
temperament would regain control and suppress the impulse to kill.54
Jurisdictions also vary on whether defendants must establish complete loss
of self-control in order to prevail on a provocation claim. In some
jurisdictions, provoked killers do not need to prove complete inability to
control their behavior.55 Instead, defendants must demonstrate that ordinary
individuals in similar circumstances would have also been similarly
provoked.56 Yet other jurisdictions go as far as requiring the defendant to

passion . . . .”). When discussing whether a voluntary manslaughter jury instruction should
have been given, Kansas courts use loss of self-control language. See, e.g., State v. Hayes, 327
P.3d 414, 418 (Kan. 2014) (noting that a key element of voluntary manslaughter is provocation
that is “sufficient to cause an ordinary man to lose control of his actions and his reason”
(quoting State v. Gallegos, 190 P.3d 226, 231 (Kan. 2008))); State v. Henson, 197 P.3d 456,
463 (Kan. 2008) (“The test for whether severe provocation exists is objective, and the
provocation must be sufficient to cause an ordinary person to lose control of his or her actions
or reason.”); see also State v. Shane, 590 N.E.2d 272, 276 (Ohio 1992) (explaining that for
provocation to be reasonably sufficient to reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter “it must
be sufficient to arouse the passions of an ordinary person beyond the power of his or her
control”).
52. People v. Mendoza, 664 N.W.2d 685, 690 (Mich. 2003); People v. Pouncey, 471
N.W.2d 346, 350 (Mich. 1991).
53. State v. Adamcik, 272 P.3d 417, 448 (Idaho 2012) (affirming the trial court’s jury
instruction of malice aforethought as “[t]he defendant deliberately intended to kill as a result
of provocation which the jury determines would not have caused a reasonable person to have
lost his self-control and reason”).
54. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 707.4 (2020) (“[A] person commits voluntary manslaughter
when that person causes the death of another person, under circumstances which would
otherwise be murder, if the person causing the death acts solely as a result of sudden, violent,
and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in
a person and there is not an interval between the provocation and the killing in which a person
of ordinary reason and temperament would regain control and suppress the impulse to kill.”);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5404; State v. Chavez-Aguilar, 253 P.3d 362, 370 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011)
(upholding the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter on the theory
that there was plenty of time for the defendant to reflect on his actions after the fight with the
deceased and to regain self-control); People v. Sullivan, 586 N.W.2d 578, 582 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1998) (stating that among the elements of provocation is the requirement that “the
provocation must be adequate, namely, that which would cause a reasonable person to lose
control”).
55. See Paul Litton, Is Psychological Research on Self-Control Relevant to Criminal
Law?, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 725, 733 (2014).
56. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal
Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 305–06, 305 n.148 (1996) (observing that the provocation
defense does not require complete loss of self-control).
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establish evidence of complete inability to exercise self-control.57 These
courts stress that for provocation to be objectively reasonable, defendants
must show that they had lost all control and were unable to refrain from
committing the homicide.58 They further observe the extreme nature of the
defendant’s mental state, noting that a complete lack of self-control is “an
extreme mental disturbance or emotional state[,] . . . a state in which a
person’s ability to exercise judgment is overcome to the extent that the person
acts uncontrollably.”59 Consequently, in jurisdictions that require complete
lack of self-control, severe impairment in the ability to exercise self-control
does not suffice to establish provocation.60
The role that the loss of self-control theory plays in the provocation
defense becomes even more apparent in jurisdictions with recently revised
penal codes. Under modern manslaughter statutes, the defendant’s loss of
self-control is often an explicit element of the offense.61 Beginning in the
second half of the twentieth century and culminating in the years following
the publication of the commentary to the Model Penal Code (MPC), the
subjective prong of the defense—killing while in a heat of passion—turned
into a requirement that the defendant had lost self-control at the time of the
killing.62 Even jurisdictions that did not adopt EMED were heavily
influenced by the MPC commentary, which placed a premium on the notion
of loss of self-control.63 These jurisdictions either revised their manslaughter
statutes, stating that provocation is adequate if it causes a reasonable or

57. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 939.44(1)(b) (2020) (“‘Provocation’ means something which
the defendant reasonably believes the intended victim has done which causes the defendant to
lack self-control completely at the time of causing death.”).
58. People v. Brown, No. 249896, 2004 WL 2601712, at *1–2 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 16,
2004) (upholding the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter and
noting that there was no evidence that the defendant lost all control and was unable to act
deliberately).
59. State v. Spooner, No. 2015AP2089-CR, 2017 WL 2774491, at *7 (Wis. Ct. App. June
27, 2017).
60. Commentators believe that provocation does not require complete loss of self-control
and that provocation mitigates punishment because it impairs the actor’s volition. See Kahan
& Nussbaum, supra note 56, at 305–06.
61. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1101, 13-1103 (2020) (“‘Adequate
provocation’ means conduct or circumstances sufficient to deprive a reasonable person of selfcontrol.”); id. § 13-1103(A)(2) (“[A person commits manslaughter by] committing second
degree murder as defined in section 13-1104, subsection A upon a sudden quarrel or heat of
passion resulting from adequate provocation by the victim.”); see also MINN. STAT.
§ 609.20(1) (2020) (“[Whoever] intentionally causes the death of another person in the heat
of passion provoked by such words or acts of another as would provoke a person of ordinary
self-control under like circumstances, provided that the crying of a child does not constitute
provocation”); WIS. STAT. § 939.44 (defining “adequate” as “sufficient to cause complete lack
of self-control in an ordinarily constituted person” and defining “provocation” as “something
which the defendant reasonably believes the intended victim has done which causes the
defendant to lack self-control completely at the time of causing death”).
62. See Deborah W. Denno, Criminal Law in a Post-Freudian World, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV.
601, 650.
63. See Nourse, supra note 23, at 1340 n.54.
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ordinary person to lose self-control, or judicially interpreted provocation to
require the defendant’s loss of self-control.64
While the precise role that the loss of self-control theory plays in
jurisdictions whose provocation defense is formulated after the traditional
heat of passion defense arguably varies, the theory is undoubtedly the
cornerstone of EMED.65 Adopted only in a minority of jurisdictions, EMED
requires both a subjective element under which the defendant killed while
experiencing extreme mental or emotional disturbance and an objective
element requiring that there is a “reasonable explanation or excuse” for this
extreme mental state (as opposed to an explanation or excuse for the killing
itself).66 EMED provides a much broader basis for mitigation compared to
the common law’s heat of passion defense since the concept of extreme
emotional disturbance encompasses a wide array of circumstances under
which intense emotions cause defendants to lose self-control.67 EMED does
not require any specific provocative incident to establish the defense.68
Furthermore, it requires neither a sudden, single incident to trigger the
emotional disturbance nor a cooling off period.69 Instead, the defense is
sufficiently broad to recognize that extreme emotional disturbance may result
from a series of cumulative incidents that may build up over an extended
period, in which the defendant’s intense emotions never subsided.70
Moreover, unlike the heat-of-passion defense, which is mostly perceived as
an anger-based defense, EMED recognizes that additional emotions,
including fear, may trigger the defendant’s extreme emotional disturbance.71
While the defense’s statutory language refers only to extreme emotional
disturbance rather than loss of self-control, courts in EMED jurisdictions
routinely rely on the notion of the defendant’s loss of self-control to explain
the defense’s subjective element.72 For example, courts observe that “[a]
defendant cannot establish an extreme emotional disturbance defense without
evidence that he or she suffered from a mental infirmity not rising to the level
of insanity at the time of the homicide, typically manifested by a loss of self-

64. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (providing examples of statutory adoption
of loss of self-control); see also State v. Johnson, 236 P.3d 517, 522–24 (Kan. 2010)
(providing examples of judicial adoption of the loss of self-control requirement by Kansas
courts).
65. See Nourse, supra note 23, at 1340.
66. DRESSLER, supra note 45, at 545–46.
67. The MPC’s EMED defense combines two separate bases for mitigation: (1) the
emotional disturbance prong, which follows the steps of the common law’s heat of passion
defense, even if significantly expanding it and rejecting its rigid limits, and (2) the extreme
mental disturbance prong, which is one form of diminished mental capacity, or partial
responsibility, under the common law, reserved for mental diseases and disturbances falling
short of a full-blown insanity defense. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming
Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 827 n.114 (2003).
68. See Denno, supra note 62, at 651.
69. Id.
70. People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 908 (N.Y. 1976).
71. People v. Roldan, 647 N.Y.S.2d 179, 184 (App. Div. 1996).
72. See, e.g., State v. Lambdin, 424 P.3d 117, 125–26 (Utah 2017).
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control.”73 Other courts note that, to establish extreme emotional
disturbance, defendants must demonstrate that they acted with “a temporary
state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one’s
judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from [an] impelling force
of the extreme emotional disturbance.”74
In short, despite variation among different jurisdictions on the provocation
defense’s precise requirements, contemporary understanding of the defense
heavily draws on the loss of self-control theory to explain the defendant’s
subjective mental state, even in jurisdictions that do not make the defendant’s
loss of self-control an explicit element of the defense.75
The loss of self-control theory also figures prominently in scholarly
writings on the provocation defense. While commentators cannot agree on a
single way to describe the defense, often using different formulations to
characterize it and debating whether it ought to be understood as a partial
excuse or partial justification, most commentators agree that the notion of
loss of self-control is a key part of the defense.76 For example, Professor
Joshua Dressler observes that the underlying rationale for the provocation
defense is based on the idea of the defendant’s partial loss of self-control.77
73. People v. Roche, 772 N.E.2d 1133, 1138–40 (N.Y. 2002) (concluding that the
defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on manslaughter based on emotional
disturbance because he did not claim that he suffered from a loss of self-control).
74. Spears v. Commonwealth, 448 S.W.3d 781, 790 (Ky. 2014) (quoting McClellan v.
Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464, 468 (Ky. 1986)).
75. To be clear, in both common law and MPC jurisdictions, the defendant’s loss of
control standing alone is not sufficient to warrant a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter.
An objective element is always necessary. While EMED requires a reasonable explanation
for the extreme emotional disturbance, common-law provocation leaves the jury to decide
under which circumstances the defendant was adequately provoked. But establishing the
defendant’s loss of self-control is often a necessary prerequisite for considering whether
provocation’s objective requirement has been met. See People v. Dorch, No. 328119, 2016
WL 6992233, at *1–3 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2016) (holding that the defendant, who
claimed that he killed the deceased out of fear that a group of people were about to attack him,
did not lose control but rather acted out of reason and with control).
76. For a comprehensive summary of the extensive scholarly debate about whether
provocation is a partial excuse or partial justification, see generally Mitchell N. Berman & Ian
P. Farrell, Provocation Manslaughter as Partial Justification and Partial Excuse, 52 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1027 (2011). While the majority of commentators view provocation as
grounded in a loss of self-control rationale, a minority position rejects this view. Professor
Stephen Morse expresses the most prominent position opposing the loss of self-control theory.
See Morse, supra note 35, at 295–96. Morse argues that different actors have different
capacities for rational thinking and advocates for a general excuse defense based on
diminished rationality. Id. Morse notes that the provocation defense ought to be understood
as one example of diminished rationality, but his broader theory captures a host of
circumstances where actors’ rationality is diminished, including due to mental disorders. Id.
The diminished rationality theory that Morse advocates is not individually applied to the
specific features of the provocation defense. See id.; see also Stephen J. Morse, Rationality
and Responsibility, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 251, 255 (2000) (defining rational thought as requiring
three elements: (1) the ability to perceive accurately, to get the facts right; (2) the ability to
form justifiable beliefs; and (3) the ability to reason instrumentally, weighing the facts
appropriately and according to a minimally coherent order of preferences).
77. See Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a
Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 974 (2002) (noting that the modern defense of
provocation is about excusable loss of control and that the defendant does not need to fully
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Based on the premise that provocation is all about emotions and human
imperfections, Dressler posits that the defense is concerned with “impaired
capacity for self-control.”78 He further notes that we punish a person who
kills upon provocation because “[h]e did not control himself as much as he
should have, or as much as common experience tells us he could have, nor
as much as the ordinarily law-abiding person would have.”79 Psychology
and law professor Reid Fontaine adds that the defense ought to be understood
in excusatory terms as a provoked actor reacts to substantial emotional upset,
without which he would not have lost self-control.80
Other commentators also stress the centrality of the notion of loss of selfcontrol to contemporary understanding of the provocation defense. Professor
Victoria Nourse observes that the modern emphasis on the loss of self-control
theory represents a conceptual shift from the common law’s perception of
provocation as a partial justification towards viewing it as a partial excuse.81
Traditional provocation, her argument continues, was limited only to
predefined categories, whereas the contemporary view of the defense
recognizes a host of circumstances that may result in defendants’ loss of
control.82 Professors Dan Kahan and Martha Nussbaum further observe that,
while traditional common law emphasized victims’ wrongdoing to establish
the adequacy of provocation, de-emphasizing the defendant’s volitional
impairment, provocation laws’ modern trend is to reemphasize the notion of
loss of self-control.83
Despite general agreement that the concept of loss of control is crucial to
modern views of the provocation defense, commentators disagree on the
precise role that it plays in constructing provocation laws. Some
commentators contend that, today, loss of self-control is a distinct element of
the provocation defense. Professor Stephen Garvey, for example, notes that
the defense consists of three requirements: (1) adequate provocation; (2)
passion; and (3) reasonable loss of self-control.84 Yet others argue that loss
of self-control is not a separate element of the defense. For example,
Professors Mitchell Berman and Ian Farrell disagree with Garvey’s
description of “reasonable loss of self-control” as an independent element.85
Making it an additional requirement conflates the defense’s two separate
lose control but instead may experience substantial impairment of his capacity for selfcontrol).
78. Id. at 978–79.
79. Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 467 (1982).
80. See Reid Griffith Fontaine, Adequate (Non)Provocation and Heat of Passion as
Excuse Not Justification, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 27, 45–47 (2009).
81. See Nourse, supra note 23, at 1339.
82. See id. at 1339–40.
83. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 56, at 315 (noting that, while contemporary
provocation focuses on volitional impairment, the authors support an evaluative view which
is more consistent with de-emphasizing volitional impairment).
84. See Stephen P. Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1677, 1691 (2005) (adding
a fourth requirement that describes the effect of the defense: mitigation rather than acquittal).
85. See Berman & Farrell, supra note 76, at 1042–43.
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elements, namely, that (1) the defendant acted following a passionate
emotion of a kind and to a degree that interferes with the defendant’s ability
to exercise self-control and (2) provocation is adequate if it would provoke
an ordinary, reasonable, or average person.86 According to them,
provocation does not explicitly use the loss of control language or make it a
separate element. Instead, the notion of loss of self-control is used to explain
the passion element as an emotional response that impairs the defendant’s
ability to exercise self-control.87
This brief overview of the provocation defense demonstrates that the
defense is mostly described in judicial opinions and scholarly accounts as
predicated on the notion of loss of self-control.88 Additionally, the loss of
self-control paradigm overshadows not only jurists’ treatment of the defense
but also societal expectations. Recurring depictions of killers in popular
culture further contribute to the prevalent narrative that provoked
perpetrators lost self-control.89 The portrait of an actor who is out of control
is deeply entrenched in society’s psyche to the extent that it necessarily
constructs juries’ perceptions of the types of provoked killers who merit
mitigation of punishment. Society is willing to regard provoked killers as
less morally blameworthy because it concedes that, in some circumstances,
individuals are so overwhelmed by intense emotions that most ordinary
people in the same predicament would similarly lose self-control. But the
near-consensus that loss of self-control is provocation’s focal point should
not stop us from calling into question the wisdom of this familiar account and
revealing its limitations and deficiencies. The following Part turns to
examine what is wrong with provocation’s loss of self-control paradigm.
II. THE PITFALLS OF LOSS OF SELF-CONTROL THEORY
The wide range of defendants claiming to have been provoked to kill and
the substantial variance in the circumstances underlying their offenses cast
doubt on whether the loss of self-control theory is best suited to support
provocation’s doctrinal framework. The sections below demonstrate that the
notion of loss of self-control is not only unhelpful in its use of confusing
terminology but is also misleading for the purpose of determining the scope
of the provocation defense. Part II.A argues that reliance on the loss of selfcontrol theory sometimes results in an overinclusive application of the
provocation defense, yet other times in an underinclusive one, as Part II.B
argues. Part II.C explores the rise and fall of the loss of self-control theory

86. Id.
87. See id. at 1043.
88. See Nourse, supra note 23, at 1339–40 (“Modern theories of provocation assume that
passion knows no specific circumstances, but may arise in any situation. We partially excuse
defendants who kill in passion because they lacked self-control . . . . MPC commentary
helped to solidify and legitimize a theory of the defense based on self-control that was far
more influential than the draft itself.”).
89. See Aya Gruber, A Provocative Defense, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 283–84 (2015)
(discussing popular culture depictions of provoked killers as actors who “snapped”).
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under the insanity defense and questions why this rejected theory continues
to play a pivotal role under the provocation defense.
A. Loss of Self-Control Theory Is Overinclusive
Commentators have long noted that the contemporary understanding of
provocation’s loss of self-control theory is too expansive, resulting in courts
giving manslaughter jury instructions in cases where mitigation is
unwarranted.90 The most powerful attack on the provocation defense, often
referred to as the “feminist critique,” stresses the gender-based implications
of an overly broad view of loss of self-control theory and its detrimental
effect on female victims of male violence.91 The loss of self-control theory,
the argument continues, allows controlling men to receive manslaughter jury
instructions in cases where they claimed to have lost self-control after their
female intimate partner attempted to end the relationship.92
Commentators further lament that the loss of self-control theory is unable
to distinguish between actors who genuinely cannot control their violent
behavior (or, at the least, their ability to control such behavior is significantly
undermined) and actors who simply fail to control their violent impulses.93
Professor Donna Coker notes that professionals working with abusive men
who battered their intimate partners (but did not kill them) observe that one
of the most common excuses they gave for their violence was that they were
“out of control.”94 Several factors, however, suggest that they simply failed
to control themselves rather than being truly unable to do so. First, evidence
demonstrates that these batterers engage in risk-weighing behavior, which
contradicts their loss of self-control account, as they admittedly experience
similar rage in other settings, such as the workplace, but they do not respond
violently in those settings.95 Second, many batterers state that they did not
want to hurt their partner seriously, suggesting that they exercised some
measure of control over the degree of violence used.96
In an oft-cited 1997 article, Professor Nourse argues that laws’ reliance on
the loss of self-control theory is problematic because it masks normative
questions about which types of losses of self-control warrant mitigation.97
Nourse further contends that defendants deserve the law’s compassion only
if they stand on equal normative position vis-à-vis their victims.98 Coining
the phrase “warranted excuse,” Nourse suggests that mitigation might be
warranted only if the defendant reacted violently in response to some
unlawful act committed by the victim, one that the law independently
90. For a comprehensive summary of the scholarly critique, see generally id. at 283–99.
91. See Nourse, supra note 23, at 1335–36; see also Gruber, supra note 89, at 283–99.
92. See Gruber, supra note 89, at 294.
93. See id. (“[M]en who killed their partners in response to threatened or attempted
separation were extremely successful at getting their provocation claims to the jury.”).
94. See Coker, supra note 47, at 75.
95. Id. at 95.
96. Id. at 96.
97. See Nourse, supra note 23, at 1369–70.
98. See id. at 1396.
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punishes.99 But if the provocative incident is not in itself criminal, she
continues, the murder charge should not be mitigated to manslaughter,
especially when a woman was killed by her male intimate partner after
pursuing legal action in attempting to end the relationship.100 Nourse
concludes that the provocation defense should be denied in such cases
because it is normatively unwarranted and sends the wrong message to
women to stay with controlling spouses in unwanted relationships.101
Two decades after Nourse’s scathing critique, courts continue to instruct
juries on manslaughter charges in circumstances where mitigation is
unwarranted from a normative perspective. A 2012 New York Court of
Appeals decision poignantly demonstrates the implications of the law’s
continued reliance on an overly expansive view of a defendant’s loss of selfcontrol. The highly disturbing facts underlying the decision in People v.
McKenzie102 show that the defendant stabbed his girlfriend with a knife fortyseven times following a heated verbal confrontation between them about the
victim’s admission that she was sexually unfaithful and her refusal to engage
in sexual relations with the defendant.103 The defendant retrieved a knife
from the kitchen and, as the argument escalated into a physical altercation,
repeatedly stabbed her to death.104 Shortly after, the defendant admitted the
killing to a friend, claiming that it was the result of loss of self-control as he
had “just snapped.”105 That friend testified that the defendant appeared
“spaced out” and “out of it” at the time of the incident.106 In a 911 call
explaining to the dispatcher what had happened, the defendant also said that
he had “just lost it” and had “blacked out.”107
The trial court refused to instruct the jury on manslaughter, reasoning that
while the manner of the repeated stabbing of the victim was indicative of the
defendant’s loss of self-control, there was no evidence that the defendant had
a mental infirmity that fell short of a mental disease or disorder, as the EMED
defense requires.108 The jury convicted the defendant of second-degree
murder and the defendant appealed.109 The Court of Appeals agreed with the
defendant that a jury instruction on manslaughter should have been given.110
The court stressed that the extreme emotional disturbance defense does not
hinge on evidence of an underlying psychiatric disorder and that courts use
the term “mental infirmity” in the broader sense, referring to “any reasonably

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 1334.
976 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. 2012).
Id. at 219.
Id.
Id. at 220.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 220–21.
Id. at 219.
See id. at 220.
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explicable emotional disturbance so extreme as to result in and become
manifest as a profound loss of self-control.”111
The court’s conclusion that the subjective component of the EMED
defense—the defendant’s loss of self-control—was satisfied is hardly
problematic. Indeed, the evidence introduced at the defendant’s trial
established that, as a result of his rage over his girlfriend’s admission of
infidelity, he became extremely angry.112 Moreover, the court correctly
notes that nothing in EMED’s statutory language suggests that the
defendant’s emotional disturbance ought to rise to the level of mental
infirmity.113 My critique of the court’s decision therefore does not take any
issue with the first part of the holding. But the second part of the decision
regarding the objective inquiry into whether there was a reasonable
explanation or excuse for the defendant’s extreme emotional disturbance is
deeply troubling.
In addressing EMED’s objective requirement that the evidence should
support the inference that there was a reasonable explanation for the
defendant’s emotional disturbance, the court stated that the jury could have
plausibly concluded that the victim’s rejection of the defendant, along with
her verbal disclosure of infidelity, “precipitated not just ordinary anger or
even rage, but an onrush of emotion leaving the defendant bereft of selfcontrol.”114 The court then concluded that the question of the reasonableness
of the explanation is a question of fact that should have been left to the
jury.115 By that, the court implied that the victim’s admission of sexual
infidelity might qualify as a “reasonable explanation or excuse” for the
defendant’s emotional disturbance. This position evokes archaic notions of
alleged violation of male honor, perpetuating long-discarded views that
women’s sexual infidelity excuses male violence.116
The court’s position that the reasonableness of the defendant’s explanation
ought to be decided by the jury as a question of fact is misguided. Instead,
the court should have concluded that the defendant’s claim that the victim
sexually rejected him and disclosed her sexual infidelity (a perfectly legal
course of action) is insufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute a “reasonable
explanation or excuse” for the defendant’s emotional disturbance. A judicial
statement that the defendant’s loss of control claim ought to be denied on
legal rather than factual grounds is normatively necessary and based on sound
public policy reasons. The court should have explicitly rejected the claim
that extreme rage over an intimate partner’s sexual infidelity can be
considered an objectively reasonable explanation for the defendant’s
emotional disturbance.117
111. Id. at 221.
112. Id. at 219.
113. Id. at 220–21.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 221–22.
116. See Susan D. Rozelle, Controlling Passion: Adultery and the Provocation Defense,
37 RUTGERS L.J. 197, 199, 205 (2005).
117. Id. at 219.
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Moreover, the court’s decision to let the jury decide whether the
defendant’s explanation for what the court refers to as being “bereft of selfcontrol” improperly justifies mitigation. It conveys a highly disconcerting
message to the jury. It embodies a problematic normative statement that
implies that there are circumstances where a woman’s sexual taunting of a
man is so severe as to deprive him completely of self-control and that the
jury may plausibly consider her behavior as a reasonable explanation for his
lethal violence.118 Furthermore, this holding not only conflates EMED’s
subjective and objective inquiries but also practically obliterates the
defense’s necessary normative aspect. Under EMED, the defendant’s loss of
self-control alone is never sufficient to satisfy the defense’s elements.119
Rather, it must be supplemented with an objective component, namely, proof
that there was “a reasonable explanation or excuse for the defendant’s
emotional disturbance.”120 In McKenzie, however, the court’s analysis
focused solely on the reasonableness of the explanation from the defendant’s
viewpoint,121 which not only de-emphasized the objective element but also
stripped the defense of any normative dimension.
In addition, the argument that the loss of self-control theory results in an
overinclusive application of the provocation defense stands even without
embracing the feminist critique. Gender-neutral arguments similarly support
the conclusion that the theory is overly broad, as it might result in partial
mitigation where it is unwarranted from a normative perspective. As
Professor Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff notes, control failure is a
psychological concept that is primarily observational, catching within its
wide net a host of actors whose conduct may fairly be described as “out of
control.”122 As an empirical matter, the argument continues, many offenders
may be viewed as having lost their self-control, yet the criminal law is
Notably, highly intoxicated
unwilling to partially excuse them.123
perpetrators who killed while under the influence of drugs or alcohol have
similarly lost their self-control, yet the law rarely reduces their punishment
on these grounds.124 Hollander-Blumoff suggests that the criminal law
118. Cf. People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1976) (giving a voluntary manslaughter jury
instruction for the defendant who killed his wife after she sexually taunted him and admitted
infidelity). For a critique of the Berry decision, see CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE
REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 17–19, 43–45 (2003).
119. People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310, 1316 (N.Y. 1980).
120. Id.
121. People v. McKenzie, 976 N.E.2d 271, 220–21 (N.Y. 2012).
122. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 26, at 505, 510 (noting the difference between
self-control in psychology and criminal law).
123. Id.
124. While most jurisdictions refuse to recognize defendants’ voluntary intoxication as a
defense to a crime, some jurisdictions do recognize it as a defense to those crimes requiring
the mens rea of knowledge or intent. In some states, the defendant’s voluntary intoxication
may be a partial defense to crimes that require specific intent or a mens rea of purpose or
knowledge. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Henson, 476 N.E.2d 947, 953 (Mass. 1985) (holding
that the defendant may introduce evidence showing that, because of intoxication, he did not
premeditate or deliberate the homicide); State v. Brown, 931 P.2d 69, 73–75 (N.M. 1996)
(holding that excessive consumption of alcohol can negate the statutory requirement of
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underestimates the situations in which perpetrators have lost their selfcontrol because its conception of control failure is normative and socially
construed, whereas psychologists use overly broad and descriptive
definitions of control failures.125
Indeed, the main problem with an overly broad understanding of the loss
of self-control theory is that it lacks any prescriptive dimension, which may
provide some guidelines for deciding who among actors who have lost selfcontrol might deserve mitigation of punishment from a normative standpoint.
Since criminal excuses are generally predicated on society’s normative
evaluations of defendants’ behaviors, the broadly defined loss of self-control
theory proves misguided for that purpose.126 One reason for the misguidance
is that the theory focuses on the effect of intense emotions on defendants’
violent behavior. Such a descriptive account cannot meaningfully contribute
to understanding the cause behind the behavior. Instead, a plausible way to
distinguish among different types of actors who have lost self-control is by
shifting the emphasis from the effect of behavior to its cause and evaluating
the behavior from a normative standpoint. This point is revisited in Part IV.B
by considering adding a requirement that would limit the application of the
provocation defense in circumstances where the deceased committed no legal
wrong. For the moment, it is sufficient to acknowledge that society might be
willing to offer some leniency only if lethal violence is caused by somewhat
understandable reasons.
B. Loss of Self-Control Theory Is Underinclusive
The critique of provocation’s loss of self-control theory on overbreadth
grounds has been so influential that it eclipsed the fact that this theory
sometimes proves too narrow for certain types of perpetrators, including
female defendants whose behavior does not comport with the perceived
image of a loss of self-control.127 To date, however, commentators have yet
to acknowledge that the loss of self-control theory may also be
underinclusive in some circumstances.
Exposing this hidden dimension of the loss of self-control theory is
especially imperative because underinclusiveness concerns are arguably
more troubling than overinclusiveness ones.
An overly narrow
understanding of loss of self-control creates a threshold that might foreclose
the only way of giving jury instructions on manslaughter. If courts find that
the subjective loss of self-control requirement is not established, the
objective requirement, which is much harder to satisfy, will likely not be met
and the provocation claim may not be brought before a jury. In contrast, an
subjective or actual knowledge). However, some jurisdictions categorically reject the excuse
of intoxication as a defense to all crimes, including intentional murder. See, e.g., MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-2-203 (2020) (providing that an intoxicated person “is criminally responsible” and
“an intoxicated condition is not a defense to any offense”).
125. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 26, at 504–05.
126. See generally John Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 575, 578–79
(1998).
127. See, e.g., supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text.
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overly broad construction of provocation’s subjective prong neither dictates
the final outcome of the case nor necessarily results in unwarranted
mitigation. The defendant’s loss of self-control is never, in itself, a sufficient
basis for mitigation.128 Under all formulations of the defense, an additional
objective element is required, whether it is an inquiry into the adequacy of
provocation or into the reasonableness of the explanation for the emotional
disturbance.129 Therefore, the harms of refusing to consider mitigation if
provocation is too narrowly construed far exceed the harms of giving juries
more manslaughter instructions. Such harms are especially pronounced in
our current criminal justice system, whose sentencing laws are excruciatingly
harsh, including mandatory minimums for offenders convicted of murder
charges.130 Moreover, the consequences of excluding manslaughter jury
instructions are particularly detrimental for defendants of color who
comprise a majority of murder defendants.131
Several reasons support the argument that the loss of self-control theory
often proves underinclusive. The theory mostly envisions an enraged actor
who experiences an uncontrollable impulse to react violently immediately
following a sudden provoking incident.132 This view, however, provides
only a partial account of provoked killers.133 It fails to take into consideration
the typical reactions of certain types of provoked killers whose behavior does
not externally manifest as loss of self-control.134 People may be provoked to
act violently in a wide range of situations, for which the loss of self-control
theory does not account.135 Consequently, jury instructions on manslaughter
are not given in a host of circumstances, precluding potential mitigation for
defendants when it might be normatively warranted.
To begin, the loss of self-control theory does not neatly fit within situations
in which defendants were provoked to kill by emotions other than anger. The
theory is largely predicated on the emotions of anger and rage, failing to
recognize other intense emotions such as fear and desperation.136
Historically, anger was perceived as the righteous response of a man whose
honor, judged by masculine norms, had been wrongly violated by the
deceased, leading the actor to respond physically and angrily.137 Today,
provocation continues to be perceived mostly as an anger-based defense due
128. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
130. See Caroline Forell, Domestic Homicides: The Continuing Search for Justice, 25 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 5–6 (2017); see also Gruber, supra note 89, at 325–27.
131. See Aya Gruber, Murder, Minority Victims, and Mercy, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 129, 185
(2014) (discussing the disparate effects of heavy-handed sentencing laws on racial minorities
through homicide statistics).
132. See supra Part I.
133. See Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 30, at 1739–56.
134. Id. at 1739–40.
135. See id. at 1738–56.
136. See id. at 1780–81.
137. See Berman & Farrell, supra note 76, at 1036–37 (elaborating on Professor Jeremy
Horder’s account of the development of the provocation doctrine under English law, under
which the defendant, a “gravely affronted man[,] was justified in responding physically and
angrily”).
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to the prevalence of the loss of self-control paradigm.138 Ample
psychological research supports the behavioral effects of anger on a person’s
ability to maintain self-control, finding a strong connection between anger
and reactive aggression.139 The notions of anger and loss of self-control are
closely linked, operating as cause and effect in triggering provocation; anger
is the cause for the defendant’s behavior and its effect is loss of self-control.
Scant scholarly attention has been given to the fact that fear is another type
of intense emotion that might trigger provocation. In a 1986 student
comment, Lauri J. Taylor critiques the provocation defense as being overly
narrow, failing to provide mitigation to provoked women who kill abusive
intimate male partners out of fear.140 Taylor argues that men typically react
to provocative incidents caused by the deceased with anger, whereas women
typically react to the deceased’s behavior mostly with fear, depression, and
sadness.141 Provocation stemming from women’s fear may be cumulative,
differing from men’s sudden anger that leads them to kill immediately.142
Taylor concludes that the provocation doctrine privileges men’s anger over
women’s fear.143 Taylor’s argument that current understanding of
provocation is too narrow largely remains underdeveloped in the literature.
Instead, the opposite argument that the loss of control theory is overly broad
took hold.144
Taylor’s critique, however, is only partially correct. She is right that the
anger-based understanding of provocation disadvantages women
perpetrators who sometimes kill domestic abusers in nonconfrontational
situations, out of fear for their lives, and that provocation laws privilege anger
over other emotions. But Taylor is wrong in making the essentializing
assumption that all women are always provoked to kill by fear while all men
are always provoked by anger. Granted, it may be empirically correct that
some women kill male partners who physically abused them out of fear rather
than out of mere anger. But in reality, some women kill out of anger and
jealousy, just like some men kill out of fear.145 Case law demonstrates that
138. Dressler, supra note 79, at 959 n.5 (noting that provocation law is mostly about anger).
139. See generally LEONARD BERKOWITZ, AGGRESSION: ITS CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND
CONTROL (1993); Leonard Berkowitz, On the Formation and Regulation of Anger and
Aggression: A Cognitive-Neoassociationistic Analysis, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 494 (1990);
Jennifer S. Lerner & Larissa Z. Tiedens, Portrait of the Angry Decision Maker: How
Appraisal Tendencies Shape Anger’s Influence on Cognition, 19 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING
115 (2006).
140. See Laurie J. Taylor, Comment, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-ofPassion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1679, 1704–07 (1986).
141. See, e.g., id. at 1714–15 (describing fear).
142. Id. at 1719.
143. See id.
144. See supra Part II.A.
145. See, e.g., People v. Davidson, No. B223722, 2012 WL 1534352, at *2, *15 (Cal. Ct.
App. May 2, 2012) (affirming the conviction of a woman who killed her husband out of anger
because he was having an affair); State v. Ruiz-Ascencio, 406 P.3d 900 (Kan. 2017) (affirming
the conviction of a male defendant who killed another man out of fear); State v. Story, 334
P.3d 297 (Kan. 2014) (affirming the conviction of a female defendant whose jealousy led her
to kill her girlfriend’s female date).
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defendants who are provoked to kill by fear are often men who kill other men
in social encounters such as “drug deals gone sour.”146 The essentializing
claim that women necessarily kill out of fear and men necessarily respond in
raging anger is therefore not only misleading but it also impedes doctrinal
developments that would extend the provocation doctrine to additional types
of defendants, male and female.147
Instead, the gender-neutral argument advanced here is that the loss of selfcontrol theory is underinclusive because it accommodates mostly
defendants—men and women—who act out of anger, failing to provide a
basis for mitigation for defendants—both male and female—who act out of
fear. The law ought to recognize fear-based provocation and acknowledge
that the implications of recognizing such a defense extend above and beyond
familiar gender-based dichotomies, including, among others,
accommodating the experiences of men who kill other men out of fear in
circumstances falling short of self-defense.148 Recognizing provocation
triggered by powerful emotions beyond anger requires abandoning the loss
of self-control theory, which mostly fits behavioral features typical of angry
actors, rather than fearful or desperate ones.
Another reason why the loss of self-control theory is underinclusive is that
it fails to capture the fact that not all provoked actors visibly appear as if they
have lost their self-control. When actors are provoked by fear, rather than by
anger, there is often no evidence suggesting that they had lost self-control, as
their behavior fails to externally manifest the type of reactions that decision
makers expect people who are “out of control” to exhibit.149 The loss of selfcontrol theory mistakenly assumes that actors visibly display their emotions,
making it easy for decision makers to discern whether they had lost their selfcontrol. Psychological research, however, shows that people do not always
display the appropriate emotions before making a decision and that people
who do not display emotion often have an impaired ability to make good
decisions.150 The problem is that court decisions often do not take this reality
into account, treating loss of self-control, instead, as a necessary part of the
defendant’s state of mind.151 Courts typically rely on defendants’ own
testimonies, as well as other witnesses’ testimonies, to conclude that the
defendant’s conduct was neither indicative nor consistent with a loss of self-

146. See Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 30, at 1754.
147. See generally Jamie R. Abrams, The Feminist Case for Acknowledging Women’s Acts
of Violence, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 287, 309–12 (2016) (critiquing the gendered-based
stereotypes surrounding female perpetrators who killed their abusers and noting that the
criminal justice system not only pathologizes them but also treats female perpetrators more
harshly, especially when they do not fit the traditional scripts about femininity).
148. See Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 30, at 1725–26.
149. See, e.g., State v. Mack, 694 N.E.2d 1328, 1331 (Ohio 1998); State v. Goff, No.
11CA20, 2013 WL 139545, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2013).
150. See Antonio R. Damasio, The Somatic Marker Hypothesis and the Possible Functions
of the Prefrontal Cortex, 351 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS 1413, 1418 (1996).
151. See, e.g., People v. Dorch, No. 328119, 2016 WL 6992233, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App.
Nov. 29, 2016) (per curiam).
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control image that is associated with the provocation defense.152 This onedimensional dependence on loss of self-control results in courts’ refusal to
give jury instructions on manslaughter when defendants are not perceived as
having been provoked because they failed to exhibit an angry state of
mind.153
The problem is further exacerbated in circumstances where provoked
killers appear calm and composed. Yet, the psychological reaction of
suppressing emotions explains why it is fairly common for defendants to
visibly exhibit behavior suggesting that they are in control.154 Research
shows that emotions are often suppressed only to reoccur at a later point in
time.155 While some actors might respond immediately following a
provoking incident, others may be successful at suppressing intense emotions
at the moment of the incident, thus not appearing to have lost self-control.156
Relatedly, another typical emotional reaction involves rumination on the
provoking incident, as individuals may keep ruminating on the incident for a
while, only to react to it later on.157 Psychological studies further find that
when these intense emotions subsequently resurface, they might be even
more powerful than their original manifestation.158 This explains why
defendants’ fear and anger, which initially might have been successfully
suppressed for a long period of time, could not have been tamed and
regulated any longer, resulting in lethal violence.
Another reason why the loss of self-control theory often proves
underinclusive lies with the fact that it is premised on the assumption that
defendants were suddenly provoked and overwhelmed by instantaneous,
unexpected anger that caused them to immediately erupt in a violent attack.
The theory’s emphasis on the suddenness of the provoking incident assumes
that a temporal requirement is embedded in the provocation defense.159
Indeed, manslaughter statutes in many jurisdictions require that the
provocation is caused by a sudden, inflammatory incident.160 This vision of

152. See, e.g., State v. Hernandez, No. 2 CA-CR 2009-0232, 2010 WL 3341283, at *2
(Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2010).
153. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Patton, 936 A.2d 1170, 1176 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
154. See Steven J. Sherman & Joseph L. Hoffmann, The Psychology and Law of Voluntary
Manslaughter: What Can Psychology Research Teach Us About the “Heat of Passion”
Defense?, 20 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 499, 506 (2007).
155. See Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Emotion and Decision Making, 66 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL.
799, 812 (2015).
156. See Norman J. Finkel, Culpability and Commonsense Justice: Lessons Learned
Betwixt Murder and Madness, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 11, 48–49 (1996)
(noting that psychological research shows that adults who have suffered abuse in childhood
may strongly react in the heat of passion in adulthood).
157. See Lerner et al., supra note 155, at 812; see also State v. Gounagias, 153 P. 9, 14
(Wash. 1915).
158. See Lerner et al., supra note 155, at 812.
159. See Christine M. Belew, Comment, Killing One’s Abuser: Premeditation, Pathology,
or Provocation?, 59 EMORY L.J. 769, 793–96, 800 (2010) (noting that provocation law’s
suddenness requirement assumes a temporal element).
160. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.03 (LexisNexis 2020) (requiring a “sudden fit
of rage”).
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emotions’ immediate effect, however, is not always accurate because
provocation is often cumulative.161 The notion of cumulative provocation
refers to the idea that emotional arousals stemming from anger, fear,
desperation, and hopelessness may build up over time, culminating in lethal
violence after the defendant has reached a “breaking point.”162 The loss of
self-control theory proves too narrow whenever homicides are committed in
response to cumulative provocation, which are not manifested as a sudden
loss of self-control and are erroneously interpreted as cold acts of calculated
revenge, namely, as premeditated killings.163
The notion of cumulative provocation is buttressed by research findings
on suppression of emotions that show why individuals who have been
subjected to multiple emotional arousals react only after reaching a breaking
point.164 Research also shows that the emotions of anger and fear are
inextricably linked rather than mutually exclusive to the extent that
experiencing fear promotes anger, so that if actors fear, they also become
increasingly angry.165 This research carries practical implications for
understanding the reactions of provoked killers who might react violently due
to the combined effect of multiple provoking incidents rather than a single
and sudden event. However, courts often refuse to give manslaughter
instructions in cases where there is no evidence showing that the defendant
suffered a sudden, unanticipated loss of self-control.166 Many jurisdictions
explicitly reject the notion of cumulative provocation, insisting that the
defendant’s passion must be sudden and caused by the deceased’s highly
provoking act.167
The requirement that the defendant’s emotional arousal results from a
single and sudden provoking incident might seem plausible where the parties
have never met prior to the altercation at issue, such as a road rage incident
or a drunken bar brawl, or where there is no tumultuous history or intimate
relationship between them.168 In contrast, in circumstances where the
defendant and the deceased have known one another prior to the encounter
preceding the killing, case law demonstrates that provoking behavior patterns
may develop over considerable time as opposed to sudden and heightened
instigative situations which manifest in a single moment of loss of self161. Cf. Finkel, supra note 156, at 49.
162. Pennsylvania courts, for example, have long adopted the theory of cumulative
provocation. See Commonwealth v. McCusker, 292 A.2d 286, 290 (Pa. 1972); see also
Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772, 782 (Pa. 1989).
163. See, e.g., State v. Gonzales, 884 N.W.2d 102, 121–23 (Neb. 2016) (holding that the
evidence did not support a finding of “sudden quarrel” manslaughter in a case where the
defendant left the crime scene and returned later with a weapon and that the “killing appear[ed]
to be an act of vengeance”).
164. See Finkel, supra note 156, at 48–49.
165. See Jun Zhan et al., The Neural Basis of Fear Promotes Anger and Sadness
Counteracts Anger, NEURAL PLASTICITY, June 2018, at 1, 12.
166. See, e.g., People v. Sepulveda, 65 P.3d 1002, 1006–07 (Colo. 2003).
167. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-104 (2020); People v. Lanari, 926 P.2d 116, 121
(Colo. App. 1996).
168. See, e.g., State v. Gover, No. 05AP-1034, 2006 WL 2411531, at *1–2 (Ohio Ct. App.
Aug. 22, 2006).
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control.169 Provocation in these cases is not caused by a sudden, single
reaction but, instead, by a culmination of a series of provoking incidents.
Cumulative provocation is particularly prevalent in circumstances
involving intimate partner battering.170
The most common reason
domestically abused individuals kill their batterers is a misperceived need for
self-protection, namely overreaction to a threat that cannot meet selfdefense’s strict requirements.171 Recognizing cumulative provocation is
essential, especially in circumstances where the defendant and the deceased
have been involved in a long-term physically abusive relationship, consisting
of tension-building scenarios, where repeated provocative incidents have
progressively built up in a slow burn reaction that culminated in homicide.172
Provocation law’s continued reliance on the loss of self-control theory, which
fails to acknowledge this gradual process, therefore hinders any doctrinal
development of the notion of cumulative provocation. Rejection of this
theory is thus a necessary measure for accommodating provocation’s
cumulative effect.
C. Loss of Self-Control Theory’s Rejection in the Insanity Defense Context
An analogy to the related doctrine of the insanity defense further supports
my contention that provocation’s loss of self-control theory is flawed. Loss
of self-control is not a concept distinct to the provocation defense’s realm.
One of the tests for the insanity defense is also predicated on defendants’ lack
of self-control, namely, substantial impairment in volition.173 The essence
of this test is that perpetrators who are found to be legally insane are
perceived as unable to exercise self-control over their behavior and they are
therefore not subject to criminal penalty.174
The law’s treatment of defendants who suffer from mental disorders that
affect their ability to control their conduct has considerably fluctuated over
the years, first towards recognizing a volition-based test as one basis for the
insanity defense but later shifting away from such test.175 Historically,
volition-based tests were not a part of the insanity defense, which was limited

169. See, e.g., People v. Wharton, 809 P.2d 290, 320 (Cal. 1991) (holding that the trial
court also should have given the instruction that “legally adequate provocation could occur
over a considerable period of time”).
170. See, e.g., State v. Jacobson, 418 P.3d 960, 965–67 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) (upholding
the defendant’s murder conviction of her live-in boyfriend after ruling that psychiatric
evidence that the defendant suffered from PTSD as a result of past acts of domestic violence
by the deceased was inadmissible because it rested solely on the defendant’s account).
171. See Caroline Forell, Gender Equality, Social Values and Provocation Law in the
United States, Canada and Australia, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 27, 28–29 (2006).
172. See, e.g., State v. Vogel, 85 P.3d 497 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
173. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 26, at 514–17; see also Jane Campbell Moriarty,
Seeing Voices: Potential Neuroscience Contributions to a Reconstruction of Legal Insanity,
85 FORDHAM L. REV. 599, 617–18 (2016).
174. Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 26, at 517.
175. See Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S.
CAL. L. REV. 777, 781–82 (1985).
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to include only defendants’ cognitive incapacity.176 Under the M’Naghten
test, adopted in all U.S. jurisdictions, defendants were deemed legally insane
if they were incapable of knowing the nature and quality or understanding
the legal or moral wrongfulness of the criminal act.177 The cognitive-based
insanity defense was subject to extensive critique, on the grounds that it was
too narrow, accommodating only defendants suffering from psychoses and
ignoring a host of other mental disorders that affect defendants’ ability to
control their conduct.178
Heeding this criticism, most states, as well as federal courts, expanded
their insanity defense by adding an inquiry into defendants’ capacity for
volitional control.179 Broadly stated, laws adopted one of two types of
control-based insanity tests. The earlier of the two, often referred to as the
“irresistible impulse” test, provides that the defendant may be found legally
insane if, as a result of a mental disorder, he or she acted from an irresistible
and uncontrollable impulse and had lost the power to choose between right
and wrong to avoid committing the act.180 The MPC advocated a broader
control-based test, under which an actor may be found legally insane if, as a
result of a mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity to
appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law.181 While different jurisdictions use
various formulations for their volition-based insanity defenses, the notion of
impairment in the capacity for self-control plays a prominent role under any
of these tests.182 The underlying idea behind all volition-based tests is that
actors whose mental disorders affected their ability to exercise self-control
will not be responsible for their criminal conduct.
In the past three decades, however, the volition-based test of the insanity
defense was subjected to fierce scholarly attack.183 The application of the
test proved problematic given questionable acquittals, most notably that of
John Hinckley, who was acquitted of the attempted assassination of President
176. See generally Stephen P. Garvey, Agency and Insanity, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 123 (2018)
(discussing the historical development of insanity tests).
177. See Morse, supra note 175, at 806 & n.89.
178. See Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability
in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1210–12 (2000).
179. DRESSLER, supra note 45, at 348–49, 483.
180. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749–53 (2006).
181. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 4.01–4.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
182. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 26, at 515 (noting that, while all tests for the
insanity defense rest on the idea that the defendant committed a crime because he or she could
not control their violent behavior, the role of the loss of self-control theory is especially
dominant under the volition prong of the insanity defense).
183. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Against Control Tests for Criminal Responsibility, in
CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 449, 449–51 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter
Morse, Against Control Tests] (discussing his objections to control-based tests); Stephen J.
Morse, Mental Disorder and Criminal Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 885, 929 (2011)
[hereinafter Morse, Mental Disorder]; Richard J. Bonnie, Remarks at Symposium on the
Affirmative Defense of Insanity in Texas: Why “Appreciation of Wrongfulness” Is a Morally
Preferable Standard for the Insanity Defense 50, 51–52, 59–60 (Feb. 7, 2003),
http://www.txpsych.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/insanitytranscript.pdf [https://perma.cc/
94ZU-ZDTF].
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Reagan, despite extremely thin evidence that Hinckley was unable to control
his conduct.184 The public perceived these acquittals as unwarranted,
blaming the insanity defense’s volition-based test as the primary culprit.
Scholars critique the control-based insanity test mainly due to the lack of
scientific research that is capable of distinguishing inability to exercise selfcontrol from simply failing to control behavior.185 Professor Stephen Morse
is the most prominent critic of control-based tests, arguing that courts should
reject altogether the notion of an “uncontrollable” urge or any other purported
loss of control as a basis for the insanity defense.186 Morse contends that the
loss of self-control criterion for the purpose of determining criminal
nonresponsibility is “conceptually unclear, scientifically and clinically
unverifiable, and practically unworkable.”187 Morse further suggests that
only a defect in the capacity for rationality can work as a coherent
nonresponsibility criterion.188 He thus advocates replacing the loss of selfcontrol test with a lack of capacity for rationality to determine legal
insanity.189
Additionally, Professor Richard Bonnie notes that the main problem with
control-based tests is that psychiatrists do not believe they have a sufficient
scientific basis for measuring a person’s capacity for self-control or for
calibrating the impairment of that capacity.190 The American Psychiatric
Association opined that “[t]he line between an irresistible impulse and an
impulse not resisted is probably no sharper than that between twilight and
dusk.”191 Bonnie concludes that, since psychiatrists are unable to draw a
meaningful line between control incapacity and control failure and between
different degrees of impairment, there is no objective basis for legally
distinguishing between offenders who were undeterrable and those who are
merely undeterred.192
As a result of this critique, control-based insanity tests fell out of favor and
the tide turned against them. The upshot was that many jurisdictions
amended their laws by abolishing these tests, leaving intact only cognitivebased tests as bases for acquitting defendants on legal insanity grounds.

184. See Garvey, supra note 176, at 141–42.
185. See Morse, Against Control Tests, supra note 183, at 449 (providing the most
elaborate critique of volition or control tests for the insanity defense).
186. See Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1594, 1608
(1994) [hereinafter Morse, Culpability and Control]; see also Stephen Morse, Uncontrollable
Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1065 (2002) [hereinafter Morse,
Uncontrollable Urges].
187. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges, supra note 186, at 1035.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1064.
190. See Richard J. Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity Defense, 69 A.B.A. J. 194,
196 (1983).
191. Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, American Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity
Defense, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681, 685 (1983).
192. See Bonnie, supra note 190, at 197.
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Today, in about half of the states, defendants’ volitional impairment is not an
independent basis for exculpation.193
The decline of volition-based tests for the insanity defense provides a
cautionary tale that casts doubt on the continued reliance on the loss of selfcontrol theory as underpinning provocation doctrine. Provocation’s loss of
self-control theory squarely hinges on the same problematic theory that
underlies the insanity defense’s volitional impairment test. Surprisingly,
however, while most commentators agree that volition-based insanity tests
are deeply problematic, they rarely reach a similar conclusion regarding the
reliance on the loss of self-control theory in the provocation defense or call
for an overhaul of the defense’s doctrinal basis.194 However, drawing an
analogy from the convoluted history of the rise and fall of control-based
insanity tests sharpens the intrinsic flaws embedded in provocation’s loss of
self-control theory, which remains fraught with the same drawbacks
characterizing volition-based insanity tests.
In both the provocation and the insanity defense realms, there is no
psychological or psychiatric basis for accurately demarcating the line
between genuine impairment in capacity to exercise control and simple
failure to do so.195 The loss of self-control concept is indeterminate because
it captures both of these circumstances, where arguably only incapacity to
exercise control should provide grounds for mitigation.
Another
shortcoming that characterizes the loss of self-control theory is that the
precise degree to which defendants ought to experience impairment in their
capacity for self-control remains unclear. To successfully raise the
provocation defense, some jurisdictions go as far as requiring the defendant
to lose self-control completely.196 Courts in these jurisdictions stress that for
provocation to be objectively reasonable, defendants must establish that they
had lost all control and were unable to refrain from committing the
homicide.197 In other jurisdictions, however, severe impairment in the ability
to exercise self-control, falling short of complete incapacity, may suffice to
prevail on a provocation claim.198
193. DRESSLER, supra note 45, at 346; see also 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (2018) (stating the federal
test for the insanity defense, which eliminated the volitional prong).
194. But cf. Stephen J. Morse, The Irreducibly Normative Nature of Provocation/Passion,
43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 193, 194 n.4 (2009) (opposing the use of the loss of control notion
to describe the provocation defense); Nourse, supra note 23, at 1382–83.
195. See generally Paul Litton, The Mistaken Quest for a Control Test: For a Rationality
Standard of Sanity, in THE INSANITY DEFENSE: MULTIDISCIPLINARY VIEWS ON ITS HISTORY,
TRENDS, AND CONTROVERSIES 185 (Mark D. White ed., 2017).
196. See, e.g., supra note 57.
197. See, e.g., supra note 58; see also People v. Pouncey, 471 N.W.2d 346, 350–51 (Mich.
1991) (stressing that provocation is objectively reasonable when the defendant could not
refrain from the crime); State v. Spooner, No. 2015AP2089-CR, 2017 WL 2774491, at *6–7
(Wis. Ct. App. June 27, 2017) (stressing that provocation is adequate only if the defendant
could not refrain from the crime, and in this case there was no evidence that the defendant lost
all control and was unable to act deliberately).
198. See, e.g., State v. Lambdin, 424 P.3d 117, 125 (Utah 2017) (The court observed that
the notion of self-control does not rest on a binary understanding and that people do not
possess complete self-control until they reach a certain level of stress and emotion and then
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Moreover, the starkly different treatment of the same loss of self-control
theory under the provocation and insanity doctrines creates a conceptual
inconsistency that is hard to reconcile. It remains unclear why a theory that
has been widely rejected in the realm of the insanity defense continues to
play a pivotal role under the provocation defense. Arguably, there are several
differences between the use of the loss of self-control concept under the
insanity defense and its use in provocation cases. The insanity defense
requires evidence that either defendants completely lost the ability to exercise
self-control over actions or that such ability was significantly impaired.199
The provocation defense requires neither complete loss of capacity for selfcontrol nor substantial impairment in such capacity.200 Instead, it requires
evidence that an ordinary person in the defendant’s circumstances would also
have similarly experienced that same powerful emotion that led the defendant
to lose self-control.201 Moreover, loss of self-control in the insanity context
serves as a complete excuse, leading to a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity, whereas the same concept in the provocation context serves only as
a partial excuse by mitigating charges from murder to manslaughter.202
Furthermore, an objective inquiry concerning the adequacy of the
provocation supplements and significantly limits the loss of self-control
inquiry.203
Yet, these differences cannot fully account for a vastly different legal
treatment of the same theory because similar ideas regarding individuals’
capacity for control stand at the core of both doctrines. If the underlying
theme in both contexts is that the defendant committed the homicide while
being in an emotional state of inability to exercise control over conduct, there
is no principled way to explain the different legal position taken under the
two doctrines. Furthermore, the provocation defense arguably incorporates,
through the back door, a theory that has already been mostly rejected in the
closely related area of the insanity defense. It remains unclear why
defendants who suffer from mental disorders that significantly impair their
capacity to control conduct cannot be excused due to the law’s narrow
construction of insanity defense, while defendants who do not suffer from
mental disorders but lose self-control due to overwhelming emotions may be
partially excused.
Drawing on insights from the law’s treatment of volition-based insanity
tests leads to the conclusion that loss of self-control is an unsuitable legal
concept for both the insanity and provocation defenses. The main doctrinal
implication of this analogy is that the law should cease to rely on the
lose control entirely. Instead, “the average person’s ability to exercise self-control is measured
along a scale.”); Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 56, at 305–12 (observing that the provocation
defense does not require complete loss of self-control).
199. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 56, at 341.
200. See Morse, supra note 194, at 194 n.4.
201. See Litton, supra note 55, at 733–34.
202. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
203. For further discussion of the limiting effect of the adequacy requirement, see infra
Part IV.B.
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misguided loss of self-control theory as underpinning the provocation
defense and instead replace it with an alternative theory.
The following Part turns to psychological theories to consider their
ramifications on the provocation doctrine and to ultimately construct a
revised defense.
III. THE PROMISE OF DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES
From its inception, the legal concept of loss of self-control that underlies
the provocation defense was not grounded in any psychological research
explaining either the mechanisms of individuals’ loss of self-control or the
scientific meaning of control failures.204 Instead, the notion of loss of selfcontrol hinged on laypersons’ intuitive and mostly descriptive understanding
of impulsive and uncalculated behavior. As Professor Nourse succinctly
observes, provocation’s loss of self-control theory “purports to depend upon
[the defendant’s] behavior (lack of self-control), but it never provides a
behavioral theory” to support it.205
In recent years, legal scholars increasingly venture into scientific studies,
considering the implications they might carry for the law, including, among
others, criminal defenses. For example, a major area of interest for criminal
law scholars concerns neuroscience research, as brain imaging techniques
explain the neuroscientific mechanisms that lead individuals to commit
violent crimes.206 Examining psychological research for the purpose of
better understanding criminal conduct and developing criminal excuses, such
as the provocation defense, in accordance with that knowledge is yet another
step in this direction.
A. Psychological Research on Loss of Self-Control
In the past two decades, commentators began to explore psychological
research on loss of self-control to consider its implications for various legal
doctrines which draw on this notion.207 In a thought-provoking paper,
Hollander-Blumoff argues that criminal law scholars have neglected to
consider psychological studies on self-control.208 Drawing on two strands of

204. See Nourse, supra note 23, at 1369.
205. Id.
206. See generally Elizabeth Bennett, Neuroscience and Criminal Law: Have We Been
Getting It Wrong for Centuries and Where Do We Go from Here?, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 437,
450 (2016) (suggesting that developments in neuroscience will likely lead to the expansion of
existing excuses); Christopher Slobogin, Scientizing Culpability: The Implications of Hall v.
Florida and the Possibility of a “Scientific Stare Decisis,” 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 415
(2014).
207. See, e.g., Sherman & Hoffmann, supra note 154, at 513–16; see also HollanderBlumoff, supra note 26, at 505 (arguing that criminal law should rely on the insights gained
from psychological research to suggest meaningful reforms to substantive criminal law
doctrines).
208. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 26, at 503–04.
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research, she suggests that these studies carry important insights that support
a better understanding of the legal concept of self-control.209
The first strand concerns construal-level theory, which distinguishes
between low-level construal that is implicated when individuals focus on
specific details of events happening in the short term and high-level
construal, where individuals focus on future events in general and abstract
terms, carefully contemplating their behavior.210 According to psychological
research, self-control is conceptualized as acting in accordance with highlevel rather than low-level construal.211 This research further establishes that
regulation of behavior requires people to act in concert with high-level
construal, which promotes self-control.212 It also finds that individuals
whose mental representations focus on low-level qualities are less successful
at exercising self-control compared to individuals who act in accordance with
high-level construal.213
A second line of research rests on psychological experiments showing that
all voluntary effort, including cognitive, emotional, and physical, draws on a
limited pool of mental energy.214 Since individuals’ self-control is an
expandable resource, it may be completely depleted once they exert
significant effort on mental energy.215 This mental strength model of selfcontrol draws on the phenomenon of ego depletion to explain failures of selfcontrol.216 Hollander-Blumoff concludes that, in light of these psychological
studies, criminal law may significantly underestimate the host of
circumstances in which individuals do not have the ability to control their
actions.217 But she also recognizes a mismatch between psychology and law,
as psychological research on loss of self-control is mostly descriptive,
reflecting empirical reality in psychology rather than a legal and moral
position, which calls for normative judgments about behaviors.218
The turn to psychological research to support a better understanding of
legal concepts is a welcome step in the right direction.219 The psychological
account of the notion of self-control is critical to explaining criminal conduct.
209. Id. at 529.
210. See Kentaro Fujita & Jessica J. Carnevale, Transcending Temptation Through
Abstraction: The Role of Construal Level in Self-Control, 21 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL.
SCI. 248, 249 (2012); Kentaro Fujita et al., Construal Levels and Self-Control, 90 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 351, 363–65 (2006).
211. See Fujita & Carnevale, supra note 210, at 249; Fujita et al., supra note 210, at 363–
65.
212. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 26, at 533.
213. Id.
214. See Martin S. Hagger et al., Ego Depletion and the Strength Model of Self-Control: A
Meta-analysis, 136 PSYCHOL. BULL. 495, 516–18 (2010).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 26, at 505.
218. Id. at 551–52 (observing that the law makes normative judgments about the type of
behavior involved where psychology makes no such judgments).
219. Some legal scholars, however, cast doubt on whether psychological research on loss
of control has any implications for better understanding criminal defenses. See Litton, supra
note 55, at 734–39.
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Many types of criminal acts may fairly be characterized as control failures,
and psychological research describing such failures facilitates clearer
understanding of what drives criminal behavior. But psychological research
on loss of self-control does little to promote a more principled understanding
of the normative scope of the provocation defense. Psychological research
does not contribute much to the legal understanding of excuse defenses, in
general, and the provocation defense, in particular, because it does not draw
the normative line between behaviors that warrant mitigation and those that
do not.220
In addition, the problems that characterize courts’ reliance on the theory
of loss of self-control further support the conclusion that this theory
inadequately supports the legal concept underlying the provocation defense.
This conclusion calls for considering different strands of psychological
research that offer a behavioral theory that focuses on the causes for control
failures rather than merely describing its effects. Such theory would support
an alternative legal concept that is more suitable for determining the scope of
the provocation defense.
The following sections first examine behavioral psychology research
concerning judgment and decision-making, specifically, dual-process
theories. They then consider their implications for the provocation defense.
B. Psychological Research on Dual-Process Theories
Dual-process theories in general and the notion of impairment in decisionmaking processes and judgments in particular are recurring themes in
cognitive psychology today.221 These theories offer an alternative way of
understanding individuals’ information processing and reasoning, one that
rejects the basic premise underlying theories of rational choice and
deterrence that researchers previously relied upon in trying to understand
human behavior, including criminal offending.222
Rational choice theories’ approach to crime, originally developed by
economist Gary Becker as an economic-based model for understanding
individuals’ financial decisions, asserts that people are rational actors,
choosing to commit crime when it provides them with the greatest benefit.223
Drawing on Bentham’s utilitarianism, these theories hold that criminal actors
engage in a form of cost-benefit calculus to determine whether to commit a

220. Id. at 739.
221. See generally Megan Eileen Collins & Thomas A. Loughran, Rational Choice Theory,
Heuristics, and Biases, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF OFFENDER DECISION MAKING 10 (Wim
Bernasco et al. eds., 2017).
222. Id.
223. See Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, 101
J. POL. ECON. 385, 390 (1993) (providing an analysis that indicates that three factors determine
frequency of crime: (1) costs of crime due to arrest and punishment; (2) financial, social, and
personal gains from offending; and (3) a host of variables like income, time, and
opportunities).
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crime.224 Criminologists describe the decision to engage in criminal activity
as a two-stage process.225 In the “initial involvement” model, individuals
consider a host of criminal and noncriminal ways of satisfying their goals
and needs, taking into consideration their personal beliefs and experiences.226
In the “criminal event” model, actors select among certain situations to
engage in crime, based largely on the perceived costs and benefits.227
In the past decades, scholars began to cast doubt on the rational theory and
deterrence models’ ability to fully explain criminal behavior.228 Leading
legal theorists, Frank Zimring and Gordon Hawkins, urged the investigation
of a variety of factors that condition the differential effects of legal threats
and recognized that a high degree of emotional arousal is one critical factor
affecting criminal decision-making by eclipsing thought of future
consequences.229
Today, ample research demonstrates that people often do not act as rational
decision makers, instead making errors in their choices and judgments and
making decisions that are not in their best interests.230 Acknowledging the
inherent limitations in rational choice models, Nobel laureate Herbert Simon
coined the concept of bounded rationality to modify previous understandings
of rational choice models.231 Simon suggests that individuals’ perceptions
of costs and benefits are limited by their bounded rationality, a concept
referring to the cognitive, situational, informational, and computational
limitations that may influence rational decision-making and the shortcuts
people often take in making decisions. Importantly, Simon argues that “in
order to have anything like a complete theory of human rationality, we have
to understand what role emotion plays in it.”232
In recent years, behavioral psychologists developed sophisticated dualprocess theories of information processing and reasoning mechanisms to
consider how individuals make decisions when operating under intense
emotions, such as anger and fear, and in stressful situations like threatening

224. See Derek Cornish & Ronald Clarke, Introduction to THE REASONING CRIMINAL:
RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVES ON OFFENDING 1, 1–16 (Derek B. Cornish & Ronald V.
Clarke eds., 1986).
225. Ronald V. Clarke & Derek B. Cornish, Modeling Offenders’ Decisions: A Framework
for Research and Policy, 6 CRIME & JUST. 147, 167–69 (1985).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 169–70.
228. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1066–75
(2000).
229. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT
IN CRIME CONTROL 136 (1973) (“Decisions about criminal conduct that are made when a
person is in circumstances which provoke great emotional arousal may be less amenable to
threats than decisions that occur when the potential criminal is less aroused, because very high
degrees of emotional arousal may eclipse thoughts of future consequences by riveting all of
the potential criminal’s attention on his present situation.”).
230. See Cooter & Gilbert, supra note 41 (manuscript at 4).
231. See generally HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1982).
232. See HERBERT A. SIMON, REASON IN HUMAN AFFAIRS 29 (1983).
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circumstances.233 While psychologists advanced multiple strands of dualprocess theories (or dual-system models) that focus on different variables,
their theories all share some key features regarding actors’ decision-making
and judgment processes.234
Broadly stated, psychologists identify two types of thought processes
underlying reasoning and decision-making that constantly compete for
control of individuals’ actions.235 One type implicates an implicit, automatic,
fast, uncontrolled, and mostly unconscious thought process, whereas the
other implicates explicit, reasoned, slow, controlled, and conscious
thinking.236 In a given conflict between these two opposing forces, the
automatic, rapid, and partly conscious mode of thinking sometimes overrides
the intentional, controlled, and deliberate decision-making and, when that
happens, actors’ behavior is sometimes harmful, not only to their own
interests but also to others.237 Moreover, research shows that when the
automatic thought processing is operated, actors tend to rely on a single
explanation for a situation rather than search and weigh all the evidence to
find the best possible cause or explanation.238 This type of automatic and
unconscious process is also closely linked to hidden and implicit biases,
including availability bias, namely, the tendency to rely on things that people
immediately think about.239
233. See JOSEPH LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS UNDERPINNINGS OF
EMOTIONAL LIFE 149–50, 163–65, 174–78 (1998). See generally Daniel Kahneman & Shane
Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49 (Thomas Gilovich et
al. eds., 2002).
234. This Article uses the terms dual-process theories or models and dual-system models
interchangeably.
235. These systems are often referred to as “System I” and “System II,” terminology which
was originally coined by psychologist Keith Stanovich. See KEITH E. STANOVICH,
RATIONALITY AND THE REFLECTIVE MIND 16–19 (2011). Stanovich also uses the terms “Type
1” and “Type 2” processes. See Keith E. Stanovich, Distinguishing the Reflective, Algorithmic,
and Autonomous Minds: Is It Time for a Tri-process Theory?, in IN TWO MINDS: DUAL
PROCESSES AND BEYOND 55, 55–60 (Jonathan St. B. T. Evans & Keith Frankish eds., 2009).
Stanovich further clarifies that System I should be used in plural because, in actuality, it is a
set of systems in the brain that operates autonomously in response to their own stimuli and is
not under the control of the analytic process system. Id. Stanovich also suggests that dualprocess theories should be further modified to include a tripartite process model, suggesting
that in addition to System I’s automatic mind, System II should be further subdivided into
what he refers to as two separate “minds”: the algorithmic mind and the reflective mind. Id.
at 57–60. The algorithmic mind deals with slow thinking that demands computation. Id. at
58–60. The reflective mind regulates behavior at a high level of generality. Id. It refers to
individual differences in rational thinking dispositions. Stanovich further argues that
superficial or “lazy” thinking is a flaw in the reflective mind and a failure of rationality. Id.
236. See Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, In Two Minds: Dual-Process Accounts of Reasoning, 7
TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 454, 454 (2003).
237. See Jean-Louis van Gelder, Dual-Process Models of Criminal Decision Making, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF OFFENDER DECISION MAKING, supra note 221, at 166, 171.
238. See SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION: FROM BRAINS TO
CULTURE 135–44 (2008).
239. See Susan T. Fiske & Eugene Borgida, Providing Expert Knowledge in an Adversarial
Context: Social Cognitive Science in Employment Discrimination Cases, 4 ANN. REV. L. &
SOC. SCI. 123, 127–30 (2008).
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Nobel laureate, economist, and psychologist Daniel Kahneman developed
the most prominent dual-process theory, challenging previous assumptions
that individuals always make logical decisions.240 In a groundbreaking book,
Kahneman differentiates between the intuitive “System I,” which is fast and
emotional, and the deliberate “System II,” which is slower and more
logical.241 These conceptual systems process information differently;
System I “operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no
sense of voluntary control.”242 It is constantly active, waiting to operate
immediately, and heavily relies on heuristics and biases.243 For example,
System I is immediately activated when individuals’ intuitions tell them that
they are threatened and should run away from danger.244 System II is the
deliberate system, which allocates attention to effortful mental activities that
demand it.245 Its operations are often associated with the subjective
experience of agency, choice, and concentration.246 System II often prevents
inappropriate impulses from overt expression, as it overrules the impulses
generated by System I.247
Kahneman provides an elaborate account of how problems concerning
individuals’ objectively unreasonable decision-making occur, demonstrating
that this happens whenever only System I is activated.248 He contends that
individuals’ decision-making processes often consult both types of thinking
and that the division of labor between these systems works most of the time,
as acting on intuitions, feelings, and impressions usually operates well.249
But Kahneman claims that individuals tend to be overconfident, placing too
much focus on their intuitions and too little on cognitive efforts that they find
unpleasant, therefore tending to avoid them as much as possible.250 When
situations become more complex, they demand the involvement of System
II, which intervenes by correcting or replacing the erroneous intuitive
judgments generated by System I. In these circumstances, Kahneman
continues, a conflict between the dual systems arises, resulting in erroneous
judgments that occur when System II fails to get activated and correct
decisions triggered solely by System I.251 This happens because System II
calls for deliberate activation and, since it requires effort and attention, it
cannot last for long periods of time.252 System II becomes lazy as it is
depleted quickly, sometimes leading individuals to make decisions relying
240. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011). There is no
single dual-process theory but multiple accounts involving the notion of double process
reasoning with variations among them.
241. Id. at 20–21.
242. Id. at 20.
243. See id. at 19–20.
244. Id. at 20.
245. Id. at 21.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 24.
250. Id. at 45.
251. See id. at 26.
252. Id. at 21.
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solely on System I, which is much more prone to making errors in specified
circumstances.253 One of Kahneman’s key conclusions therefore is that
individuals’ decision-making and judgments that solely rely on System I may
result in irrational behavior.254
A critical part of understanding the concept of actors’ impairment in
judgment rests on highlighting the intersection of law and emotions in
general, the causal connection between intense emotional arousal, and dualprocess theories in particular. Psychologists draw attention to the
relationship between these theories and the role of emotion—often referred
to as “affect”255 in psychological jargon—in judgment and decisionmaking.256 In the past three decades, research on emotion, judgment, and
decision-making has considerably developed, examining the mechanisms
that explain the influence of affect on individuals’ behavior.257 Broadly
stated, this line of research concludes that emotions constitute powerful,
pervasive, and predictable drivers of decision-making, implicating the most
influential decisions in one’s life.258 It further concludes that impairment in
judgment may sometimes harm others.259
In the last two decades, psychological research has undergone a significant
revolution, resulting in acknowledgment of the role that emotions play in
shaping actors’ thought processes and judgment and affecting their
behavior.260 Historically, the prevalent view adhered to a dichotomy
between reason and cognition on one hand and emotions on the other.261
Emotions were traditionally understood as a threat to rationality, by
overwhelming and distorting actors’ rational thinking.262 Psychological
research, however, underwent an “affect revolution,” establishing that reason
and emotions are not contrasting concepts but rather inseparable components
of integrative thought processes and alternative decision-making choices.263
Following this conceptual shift, the contemporary understanding of
psychologists today is that emotions play a salient role in the course of
253. Id. at 25, 44–45.
254. Id. at 411–18.
255. See Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 233, at 397, 397.
256. See Evans, supra note 236, at 454.
257. See Lerner et al., supra note 155, at 801, 812.
258. Id. at 816.
259. See id. (explaining that emotions can be harmful).
260. For an excellent and recent review of the shifts in psychologists’ understanding of
emotions and the interplay between emotions and the law, see Hila Keren, Valuing Emotions,
53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 829, 847–54 (2018). Extensive literature now explores the
relationship between law and emotions. The works of Susan Bandes, Kathryn Abrams, Terry
Maroney, Martha Nussbaum and Dan Kahan, among others, examine the role that emotions
play in various contexts, including in the criminal law. See, e.g., THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan
A. Bandes ed., 1999); Kathryn Abrams, Exploring the Affective Constitution, 59 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 571 (2009); Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions?,
94 MINN. L. REV. 1997 (2010); Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 56; Terry Maroney, Law and
Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 119 (2006).
261. Keren, supra note 260, at 849.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 852.

1852

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

rational and cognitive decision-making processes.264 Under this view, reason
and emotion are not opposing forces because emotions influence actors’
thoughts and judgments and are shaped by them.265 Put differently, emotions
are not irrational forces but are in fact rational themselves and there is no
conflict between them and cognitive-based rational decision-making
processes.266 While the traditional understanding was that emotions are
static forces and direct products of certain stimuli, the contemporary view is
that emotions are complex processes that integrate highly cognitive
features.267 For example, this recognition of the complex interplay of actors’
cognition and their emotion rejects the dated view that anger and fear are
bursts of negative feelings accompanied by some visceral reactions, adhering
instead to the understanding that these emotions are integral parts of actors’
cognitive thought processes and judgments.268
One area where intense emotions carry harmful effects on other
individuals involves the commission of crimes.269 Research on criminal
behavior shows that criminal decision-making is often affected by emotions,
sometimes directly shaped by cognitive reactions.270 The affect heuristic
suggests that people make judgments and decisions by consulting their
emotions.271 Significant research is devoted to studying the influence of both
anger and fear on judgment and choices, including the role that fear plays in
assessing risks.272 Research also demonstrates that when emotional
influences are unwanted and deleterious, it is difficult to reduce their effect
through effort alone, even if under certain circumstances, such harmful
effects can be reduced.273 For example, research establishes that individuals
sometimes attempt to regulate their emotions by suppressing them.274 Such
suppression, however, can be counterproductive as emotions can intensify
the very emotional state one attempts to regulate.275
Kahneman’s work integrates dual-process theories with psychological
research on the role that intense emotions play in judgment and decisionmaking. Interweaving these multiple layers of psychological research,
Kahneman’s project clarifies the ways that emotion-based decisions are
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id. at 853.
Id. at 853–54.
Id.
Id. at 854.
Id.
See generally NORMAN J. FINKEL & W. GERROD PARROTT, EMOTIONS AND
CULPABILITY: HOW THE LAW IS AT ODDS WITH PSYCHOLOGY, JURORS, AND ITSELF (2006).
270. See Carlton J. Patrick & Debra Lieberman, Not from a Wicked Heart: Testing the
Assumptions of the Provocation Doctrine, 18 NEV. L.J. 33, 45–47 (2017).
271. See Slovic et al., supra note 255, at 397; see also PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF
RISK 415–25 (2000).
272. See, e.g., Joseph Cesario et al., The Ecology of Automaticity: How Situational
Contingencies Shape Action Semantics and Social Behavior, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1311, 1312
(2010) (focusing on fear); Lerner & Tiedens, supra note 139, at 115–37 (focusing on anger).
273. See Lerner et al., supra note 155, at 812.
274. See Richard M. Wenzlaff & Daniel M. Wegner, Thought Suppression, 51 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 59, 61–62 (2000).
275. Id.
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made through the use of automatic processing and heuristic reasoning, which
occur rapidly, unintentionally, and without much awareness. This account
explains why intense emotional arousals cause impairments in individuals’
judgment and decision-making processes. Kahneman further elaborates on
the links between System I and emotions like anger and fear, stressing that
these intense emotions trigger the automatic, semiconscious, and intuitive
modes of System I’s thinking.276 He also notes that the amygdala part of the
brain, whose primary role serves as a “threat center,” is activated in various
emotional states.277 Specifically, brain imaging conducted on individuals
reveal intense responses of the amygdala to threatening pictures that they did
not recognize. Kahneman further shows that emotional arousals of anger and
fear are “associative, automatic and uncontrolled” and that they produce
impulses for protective actions.278 Individuals may not even be consciously
aware of these emotive experiences, therefore making it difficult to influence
them. Kahneman explains that even if System II may “know” that the
probability of risk is low, that knowledge does not eliminate the automatic
response of System I, which cannot be turned off.279
In addition, Kahneman demonstrates how the emotions of anger and fear
influence individuals’ judgment of probability of events and outcomes.
Emotions are not only disproportionate to an event’s probability but they are
also insensitive to the exact level of probability.280 Two key insights that
Kahneman highlights concern the related phenomena of overestimation and
overweighting.281 Overestimation happens when people exaggerate the
probabilities of unlikely events. Overweighting happens when people assign
too much weight to unlikely outcomes. Overestimation of events and
overweighting of unlikely outcomes are key features of System I and
therefore account for individuals’ excessive responses to rare events.282
“Although overestimation and overweighting are distinct phenomena, the
same psychological mechanisms are involved in both: focused attention,
confirmation bias, and cognitive ease.”283
C. Implications of Dual-Process Theories for Provocation Law
Dual-process theories have been extensively applied in the field of
economic decision-making, as these theories largely focus on the practical
implications of the two modes of thinking for behavioral economics.284
Dual-process theories, however, have far broader implications than financial
decision-making. Kahneman’s nuanced project includes multiple examples
that apply dual-process theories in a variety of different contexts, including
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

KAHNEMAN, supra note 240, at 301.
Id.
Id. at 323.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 137–45.
Id. at 324.
Id.
Id. at 256–99.
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decision-making of legal actors such as judges.285 These examples
demonstrate how overreliance on System I’s heuristics leads individuals to
erroneous thinking and faulty behaviors, including criminal offenses.
In recent years, criminology researchers began applying dual-process
theories in an attempt to better understand criminal offenders’ behaviors.286
One variation of dual-process theory distinguishes between “hot” and “cool”
modes of thinking,287 describing their influence on criminal decisionmaking. The “hot” form of information processing is the affective, or
emotion-based mode, whereas the “cool” form is the cognitive, thoughtbased mode.288 The emotions of anger and fear are perceived as immediate
emotions, namely, they are felt at the time of decision, unlike anticipated
emotions like guilt, regret, or shame that are felt only when the outcomes of
decisions are experienced.289 This “hot-cool” framework stresses the
discrepancy between people’s cognitive evaluation of a situation and their
emotional reaction to it.290 The hot-affective mode, triggered by strong
emotions, generates impulses that are influenced by variables which play
only a minor role in cognitive evaluations. Criminal behavior results from
the sole operation of the “hot” mode. Consolidating criminology-based
application of dual-process theories with research on emotions’ influence on
decision-making therefore provides important insights into understanding
one of the paradigm examples of unreasonable behavior, namely, criminal
wrongdoing.
While dual-process theories have been applied in multiple areas of study,
legal scholars have yet to consider their implications for the purpose of
criminal excuses in general and the provocation defense in particular.291 As
noted earlier, Morse has long argued that the concept of diminished
285. Id. at 43–44 (discussing the findings of a study involving eight parole judges in Israel,
who spent days reviewing applications for parole). The default decision was denial of parole,
with only 35 percent of applications approved. Id. at 43. The study found that about 65 percent
of requests were granted immediately following the judges’ meals, whereas approvals
gradually declined in the two hours before the meals, with zero approvals immediately before
the meals. Id. at 44.
286. See Kyle J. Thomas & Jean Marie McGloin, A Dual-Systems Approach for
Understanding Differential Susceptibility to Processes of Peer Influence, 51 CRIMINOLOGY
435, 440–41 (2013); Kyle Treiber, A Neuropsychological Test of Criminal Decision Making:
Regional Prefrontal Influences in a Dual Process Model, in AFFECT AND COGNITION IN
CRIMINAL DECISION MAKING 193, 195 (Jean-Louis van Gelder et al. eds., 2014) (Using dualprocess theories, researchers who examine differences in adolescents’ susceptibility to peer
pressure find that highly impulsive individuals are more susceptible to situational influences
and immediate considerations and are more likely to rely on the fast and automatic mode of
processing.).
287. Janet Metcalfe & Walter Mischel, A Hot/Cool-System Analysis of Delay of
Gratification: Dynamics of Willpower, 106 PSYCHOL. REV. 3, 3–4 (1999).
288. See van Gelder, supra note 237, at 170.
289. See George Loewenstein & Jennifer S. Lerner, The Role of Affect in Decision Making,
in HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES 619, 620–21 (Richard J. Davidson et al. eds., 2003).
290. See generally van Gelder, supra note 237.
291. But cf. Kenneth W. Simmons, Self-Defense: Reasonable Beliefs or Reasonable SelfControl?, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 51, 76–79 (2008) (citing Kahneman’s earlier work on dualprocess theory and discussing its implications for the justification of self-defense, but not
provocation).
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rationality underlies both the insanity and the provocation defenses.292
Morse suggests that a better understanding of control failures causing
criminal behavior must rest on the notion of defects in the defendant’s
rationality that are not the defendant’s fault.293
While the argument that I advance embraces Morse’s rejection of the loss
of self-control concept as underlying the provocation defense, I depart from
his suggestion that an alternative conceptualization of criminal excuses
including provocation ought to rest on the concept of diminished rationality.
As discussed above, contemporary understanding of emotions is that they are
not some irrational forces that interfere with actors’ rationality.294 Instead,
the prevalent view today is that emotions are themselves rational, an integral
part of complex cognitive processes. This view further recognizes that
emotions play a significant role in affecting actors’ decision-making
processes and their judgments.
Moreover, Morse’s call to ground excuse defenses in the theory of
diminished rationality is not supported by insights gained from dual-process
theories, particularly from the ways these theories conceptualize impairment
in thought processes and judgments. Instead of drawing on the concept of
diminished rationality, the argument below rests on the idea that the
provocation defense is best understood as grounded in the notion of impaired
judgment.
Psychological research on dual-process theories has promising
implications for considering criminal excuses in general and for revisiting
the scope of the provocation defense in particular. Applying dual-process
theories to the analysis of the provocation defense provides a doctrinal
construct that substitutes the notion of impaired judgment for the misguided
loss of self-control theory. As previously noted, one drawback of the loss of
self-control theory is that it is not grounded in any psychological theory
explaining the causes of provoked killers’ behavior.295 The notion of loss of
self-control merely describes an outcome—control failure—rather than
focusing on the causes for such failure. Conversely, dual-process theories
not only shift the focus away from effect to cause but also provide a
behavioral theory that cures the apparent disconnect between the legal
standard for provocation and the psychological research underlying it.
To be clear, the notions of loss of self-control and impaired judgment are
conceptually intertwined, representing two sides of the same coin, with the
292. See generally Stephen J. Morse, Excusing and the New Excuse Defenses: A Legal and
Conceptual Review, 23 CRIME & JUST. 329, 333–36 (1998) (positing that diminished
rationality is a basic excusing condition and that provocation and insanity exemplify how
actors’ capacity for rationality is reduced). In a later work, Morse proposes that the law adopt
a generic doctrinal mitigating excuse of partial responsibility (a “Guilty But Partially
Responsible” verdict) that would apply to all crimes when the defendant’s capacity for
rationality was substantially diminished at the time of the crime, substantially affecting the
criminal conduct. See Morse, supra note 35, at 299–300.
293. See Morse, Culpability and Control, supra note 186, at 1595.
294. See supra notes 261–68 and accompanying text.
295. See supra Part III.
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former focusing on provocation’s effect and the latter on its cause.
Psychological research supports both of these concepts, as they examine
similar questions from different angles, thus complementing rather than
conflicting with one another.296 Yet, given the many shortcomings
embedded in loss of self-control as the legal concept underlying the
provocation defense, the notion of impaired judgment is better suited for
understanding the causes for provoked actors’ behavior and for providing the
governing rationale for the defense. In particular, the impaired judgment
concept offers a broader legal construct compared with the loss of selfcontrol theory. It covers various behavioral responses that characterize
different types of provoked killings triggered by a host of intense emotions,
including ones that the loss of self-control concept fails to capture.
Dual-process theories provide a doctrinal framework that
comprehensively account for provoked actors’ thought processes and
decision-making. These theories recognize that provoked killers’ thoughts
and actions are sometimes intuitive, automatic, reflexive, and subconscious
responses and that intense emotional arousals may affect such reactions.
They further recognize that when emotions such as anger and fear affect
actors’ thought processes, their judgment may be impaired and result in
aggressive reaction.297 Importantly, dual-process theories acknowledge that
since these emotive processes occur at the subconscious level of awareness,
rather than being consciously experienced, individuals’ ability to influence
them is rather limited.298
Dual-process theories further provide a moral basis and a guiding rationale
for the provocation defense. The defense’s main purpose is to draw a legal
boundary between cold, calculated killings and those that are spontaneously
affected by extreme emotional arousal and are thus perceived as less
blameworthy.299 Dual-process theories illustrate the ways that provocation
cases exemplify the latter and actors’ behavior therefore cannot be deemed
fully calculated and objectively reasonable. The key implication of applying
dual-process theories to the provocation defense is that, since provoked
killers’ thought processes are intuitive and automatic, their judgment is
impaired and their ability to influence the operation of such processes is
296. Courts sometimes refer to these concepts interchangeably when discussing
provocation triggered by intense emotions and considering the reasonable reactions of an
average person to such emotions. See, e.g., State v. Lambdin, 424 P.3d 117, 126 (Utah 2017)
(holding that the defendant must prove that the type and amount of stress would cause the
average reasonable person’s rationality to be overwhelmingly and substantially “overborne by
intense feelings, such as passion, anger, distress, grief, excessive agitation, or other similar
emotions” and that, while the average reasonable person may experience anger or other
emotions in the face of large amounts of stress, the stress and emotion must be extreme,
indicating that the connected impaired reasoning and loss of self-control must be
overwhelming and substantial).
297. See ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS: BODY AND EMOTION IN
THE MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS 51–55 (1999) (observing that emotions are inseparable from
the idea of reward and punishment).
298. KAHNEMAN, supra note 240, at 415–17.
299. See Dressler, supra note 77, at 967–75.
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constrained. Therefore, their fault is arguably diminished, and the degree of
their criminal responsibility conceivably ought to be reduced.
Dual-process theories’ fundamental notion of impaired judgment brings
home the point that thought processes affected by various intense emotions
significantly impair actors’ judgment and choices. This may result in
criminal offending, which is the epitome of faulty judgment and decisionmaking.300 Dual-process theories explain why provoked actors kill by
stressing that their sound judgment is impaired as a result of the intuitive,
rapid operation of the emotive mode. This automatic mode of thinking
accounts for actors’ aggressive behavior, as their judgments and actions
occur fast, overriding fully reasonable thought processes and judgments.
Applying the insights of dual-process theories to the provocation defense
therefore supports the conclusion that provocation cases ought to be viewed
as one example of impaired judgment where an actor’s thinking was obscured
and failed to overrule impulsive behavior.
Dual-process theories further explain the reasons why provoked killers
make mistaken and objectively unreasonable decisions, as the psychological
research discussed above shows that overreliance on the intuitive information
processing system can lead to mistakes.301 This happens because, whenever
actors’ decision-making is triggered by reflexive thought processes, it
bypasses the corrective mechanisms that the competing fully reasoned
thought system offers and prevents the intervention of deliberate and
calculated modes of thinking. This type of thought process explains why
actors sometimes react in a way that seems objectively unreasonable. Put
differently, actors sometimes overreact to perceived threats and to certain
emotional experiences. While these overreactions are often not objectively
reasonable, they are nonetheless understandable given the circumstances that
the actors faced, such as experiencing anger and fear in response to victims’
behaviors.302
Relatedly, another problem with automatic thought processing is its
association with implicit and hidden biases because provoked actors heavily
rely on heuristics and biases.303 Among the characteristics of automatic
thought processing are the phenomena of overweighting and overestimation
and the fact that actors rely on a single explanation for a situation.304 These
features explain why actors sometimes kill out of fear, overestimating and
overreacting to what they mistakenly perceive as imminent threats.

300. See Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into
Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133, 177–78 (2000) (“[P]eople usually slide
into crime . . . because of a series of small irrational decisions.”).
301. See supra Part III.B.
302. For further elaboration on the idea of understandable reactions, see infra Part IV.
303. See generally L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self Defense and the
Suspicion Heuristic, 98 IOWA L. REV. 293, 298 (2012) (discussing the automatic thought
process in the context of self-defense and explaining the role of heuristics in mistaken selfdefense situations).
304. See supra Parts II.B, III.B.

1858

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

The impaired judgment concept thus supports a broader-based theory for
understanding the provocation defense, compared to loss of self-control, as
it covers a wider range of circumstances in which actors’ thought processes
and judgments were impaired, even if their behavior did not visibly manifest
as loss of self-control. Recall that one of loss of self-control theory’s
shortcomings is that it mistakenly relies on a binary dichotomy under which
people are either in complete control or “out of control.”305 Psychological
research, however, shows that individuals’ behavior rarely falls under such
twofold division. Psychologists believe that “people think, decide, and react
to other people along a continuum of processes [ranging] from automatic to
controlled.”306 Impaired judgment theory is better suited to capture provoked
killers’ judgment and decision-making because it recognizes that their
behavior encompasses a continuum of processes, rather than a momentary
control failure. This position aligns with the understanding that provoked
actors kill because their judgment might have been significantly impaired,
even if not completely destroyed.
Another implication of reliance on the notion of impaired judgment as
underlying provocation cases is that it provides a proper doctrinal framework
for recognizing cumulative provocation, which the loss of self-control theory
fails to do.307 As noted earlier, conceptualizing the provoked actor as
someone who temporarily loses self-control mistakenly envisions a single
moment in time in which control is lacking.308 Psychologists, however,
dismiss such static view, observing that emotional responses do not
necessarily occur at a single, discrete moment but rather may evolve over
time.309 The concept of impaired judgment encompasses this understanding
as it does not adopt a limiting temporal requirement. Instead, it rests on the
idea that judging and acting upon these judgments involve an aggregate
process rather than a static moment. The more expansive concept of impaired
judgment supports the conclusion that actors’ thought processes and
judgments can be impaired due to the cumulative effect of multiple
provoking incidents.
Relatedly, another drawback in the loss of self-control theory lies with its
restrictive cooling-off element, which assumes that shortly after experiencing
intense emotional arousal, people regain self-control.310 This assumption,
305. See supra Part II.B.
306. See Fiske & Borgida, supra note 239, at 125.
307. See supra Part II.B.
308. See, e.g., State v. Ruiz-Ascencio, 406 P.3d 900, 904 (Kan. 2017) (holding that the
quarrels were not unforeseen, abrupt, or otherwise sudden and, even if the defendant acted out
of fear, there was no evidence that he acted in the heat of passion because the quarrels began
earlier in the night, which signified that they were not sudden).
309. FINKEL & PARROTT, supra note 269, at 95–97 (rejecting a static view of emotions).
310. See, e.g., People v. Stringer, No. 310228, 2013 WL 4005911, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App.
Aug. 6, 2013) (holding that, under the circumstances of this case, a lapse of time existed, albeit
a short one, during which a reasonable person could have controlled his passions before firing
the gun and that the defendant had an opportunity to cool down before shooting the gun when
he went to his vehicle to retrieve the gun and while walking the approximately thirty feet to
the victim’s van).
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however, is mistaken, as psychologists recognize that a person’s thought
processes and judgments may remain impaired long after a provoking
incident.311 Psychologists further stress that provocation may “linger, fester,
and reactivate” over time.312 As previously noted, this perpetual effect is
especially common in situations involving domestic abuse.313 The notion of
impaired judgment, which denies that passage of time and necessarily leads
to the actor’s regaining reasonable thinking, is thus better suited for
recognizing a long-lasting provoked state, resulting in continuous
impairment in judgment.
Finally, unlike the loss of self-control theory, impaired judgment theory
recognizes a host of other emotions beyond anger that similarly impair
thought processes and judgment. Such emotions include fear, desperation,
extreme sadness, and hopelessness.314 Additionally, the loss of self-control
theory assumes that a single emotion, namely anger, operates exclusively in
a provoking incident. In reality, however, emotions are not always mutually
exclusive and may also transform over time.315 For example, defendants who
have been subjected to prolonged physical abuse at the hands of the deceased,
may concurrently experience not only anger at the deceased but also fear of
future physical harm.316 Dual-process theories recognize that actors may
simultaneously experience more than a single emotion that impairs their
judgment. In sum, dual-process theories accommodate the pervasive effects
that intense emotions have on individuals’ decision-making and judgment,
sometimes resulting in criminal behavior. The theories’ understanding of
actors’ impairment in decision-making processes and judgment is thus better
suited than loss of self-control theory to support the provocation defense.
IV. REINVIGORATING PROVOCATION’S NORMATIVE DIMENSION
As noted earlier, one of the pitfalls of the loss of self-control theory is the
fact that it purports to rest on a behavioral theory, but it is not buttressed by
any psychological research on the causes for loss of self-control.317 The
previous Part resolves this concern by showing that psychological research
on dual-process theories supplies the missing behavioral model that supports
the legal claim of provoked killers and by advocating the replacement of the
loss of self-control notion with the alternative concept of impaired judgment.

311. See Finkel, supra note 156, at 49.
312. See Norman J. Finkel, Commonsense Justice, Culpability, and Punishment, 28
HOFSTRA L. REV. 669, 689 (2000).
313. See supra Part II.B; see also SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL: RETHINKING THE
LAW OF MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER 142–44 (1998); Samuel H. Pillsbury,
Misunderstanding Provocation, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 143, 166 (2009).
314. See Lerner et al., supra note 155, at 804.
315. FINKEL & PARROTT, supra note 269, at 95–96.
316. See Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 30, at 1776–82 (elaborating on the ways that
fear impairs judgment). A full consideration of the similar effects of other emotions exceeds
the scope of this Article.
317. See Nourse, supra note 23, at 1369; see also supra note 205 and accompanying text.
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Yet, there is another major drawback in the loss of self-control theory that
dual-process theories, standing alone, are unable to rectify. While these
theories provide a behavioral account of the causes behind provoked killers’
actions, they stop short of considering the circumstances under which
mitigating punishment is normatively warranted. The concept of impaired
judgment, in itself, proves insufficient as the sole moral basis for
provocation’s partial excuse. Part IV.A addresses the inherent limitations in
relying on empirical evidence for making normative evaluations, and Part
IV.B proposes adding a key feature to provocation’s elements that would
assist juries in making such assessments.
A. The Limits of Psychological Empirical Evidence
A notable trend in recent years is the law’s increasing turn to empiricism,
namely, jurists’ reliance on empirical scientific evidence to shape law’s
substance, both for the purpose of interpreting statutes and for deciding
individual cases.318 Consistent with this direction, criminal law often turns
to disciplines such as psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and neuroscience to
make choices relevant to the scope of criminal responsibility.319
Criminal law’s reliance on empirical research to facilitate development of
existing doctrines has invaluable advantages. Historically, criminal law has
mostly counted on society’s moral intuitions and communities’ shared norms
in deciding questions regarding the limits of criminal responsibility.320
Relying on such intuitive positions sometimes resulted in the law getting it
right, but other times, in inconsistent and unprincipled outcomes.321
Elaborating on the tremendous advantages that empirically based criminal
law has over an intuition-based one exceeds the scope of this Article.
Grounding criminal law in a solid empirical basis is critical not only for
guiding decision makers to reach fair outcomes in individual cases but also
for the continued development of defenses in accordance with contemporary
scientific knowledge.322
Without minimizing the numerous benefits that empirical psychological
research in general and dual-process theories in particular carry for
developing criminal defenses, it is also crucial to raise some concerns
regarding their intrinsic limitations.323 Psychological models in general and
318. See generally Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles
and Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L. REV. 115, 123–33 (2003) (noting that many areas of law
are becoming empirical enterprises, as courts in recent years have taken an empirical turn).
319. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Three Objections to the Use of Empiricism in Criminal
Law and Procedure—and Three Answers, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 851 (discussing the problems
of criminal law’s reliance on empiricism).
320. See generally Alice Ristroph, Third Wave Legal Moralism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1151,
1154–60 (2010).
321. See Nourse, supra note 23, at 1341 (observing that the provocation doctrine is
currently in extreme disarray).
322. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter?: A Behavioral
Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 189 (2004).
323. Cf. Clare Huntington, Essay, The Empirical Turn in Family Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV.
227, 232–33 (2018) (stressing the limitation of empirical evidence in the area of family law).
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dual-process theories in particular are incapable of providing normative
guidelines to assist decision makers in determining, based on public policy
considerations, who among subjectively provoked killers ought to be
partially excused. This feature is a central constraint ingrained in attempts to
rely on empirical evidence to shape the contours of criminal defenses. This
is due to the fact that psychological research and criminal excuses have
completely different goals; psychological research provides a positivist
account, mostly describing individuals’ behaviors for the purposes of
diagnosis and treatment.324 Importantly, its goal is not to evaluate who
among those exhibiting certain behavior are less morally culpable and thus
deserving of mitigation. In contrast, criminal excuses such as provocation
are concerned precisely with determining what types of perpetrators deserve
more lenient treatment. Psychologists and criminal jurists therefore speak
different languages: while the former focuses on describing behaviors, the
latter aims to punish perpetrators according to their “just desert,” namely, in
proportion to their moral culpability.325
The psychological insights gleaned from dual-process theories, and
particularly the notion of impaired judgment, are insufficient, standing alone,
for determining the scope of criminal responsibility. They broadly apply to
many forms of criminal offending that the law is unwilling to excuse, even
partially, as a matter of sound public policy. While these psychological
theories are paramount to understanding provoked killers’ behavior, they are
unable to assist the legal inquiry into the circumstances under which courts
should instruct juries on manslaughter verdicts. Dual-process theories, or
any other psychological theories for that matter, have thus only partial impact
in shaping the scope of the provocation defense because they leave open the
question of who among defendants whose judgment was impaired deserve to
be partially excused. The point here is not to claim that psychological
research is irrelevant to provocation but to underscore the fact that it is
insufficient, in and of itself, to supply a comprehensive theoretical basis for
the defense. Impaired judgment theories, therefore, offer only partial
promise for reconstructing provocation law. They must be supplemented
with a principled theory that would not only guide decision makers in
identifying the types of provoked killers whose punishment ought to be
mitigated but would also add a limiting mechanism, grounded in normative
reasons and policy arguments, to constrain the application of the broad
construct that the impaired judgment concept offers.
B. Provocation’s Normativity
A theory that aims to identify who, among different types of provoked
killers, might deserve reduced punishment rests on the premise that it must
be grounded in normatively based inquiries, rather than in empirical
324. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 26, at 505.
325. The idea of “just desert” embodies a retributivist position under which criminal actors
should be punished in proportion to their specific wrongdoing. See generally MICHAEL
MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 84–92 (1997).
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psychological evidence. Such normative assessments are implicitly
embedded in provocation’s objective dimension, that is its “adequacy”
element. The requirement that the provocation be adequate encompasses a
prescriptive view that evaluates the defendant’s reaction in relation to the
deceased’s provoking behavior.
From its inception, the provocation defense included a subjective prong,
requiring that the defendant kill while in a heat of passion, and an objective
component, requiring adequate provocation, measured against a reasonable
person’s standard.326 Today, while adequacy remains an element of the
provocation defense in all non-MPC jurisdictions, its role has been deemphasized.327 The reason lies with the modern trend towards emphasizing
provocation’s notion of loss of self-control, which has become the heart of
the defense.328 Focusing mostly on the defendant’s subjective state of mind
results in underplaying provocation’s adequacy dimension.
Dual-process theories, with their emphasis on impaired judgment,
similarly focus on actors’ subjective mental states, as their key inquiry is
whether defendants’ overwhelming emotions impaired their judgment and
decision-making. The concept of impaired judgment is thus only capable of
addressing provocation’s subjective dimension. It is unable to provide any
insights for provocation’s objective aspect because adequacy is essentially a
normative notion which does not hinge on descriptive accounts of
defendants’ state of mind.329
Moreover, strengthening provocation’s normative dimension is necessary
as a means of offsetting the effect of applying dual-process theories, which
arguably expands the scope of the provocation defense by recognizing
additional types of provoked killings. Revitalizing provocation’s normative
dimension counterbalances such expansion by limiting the circumstances
under which provocation would be deemed adequate and by ensuring that
only defendants whose actions warrant mitigation are able to successfully
rely on the defense.
To bolster provocation’s normative dimension, the defense’s elements
must incorporate some principles that would assist decision makers in
drawing the line between impaired judgment cases that warrant mitigation
and those that do not. These principles ought to encompass intrinsic
evaluative standards that draw on shared societal norms and values to enable
decision makers to judge provoked killers’ behavior.330 Their purpose is to
guide the question of whether society is able to understand provoked killers’
326. DRESSLER, supra note 45, at 530.
327. See Joshua Dressler, When “Heterosexual” Men Kill “Homosexual” Men:
Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, and the “Reasonable Man” Standard, 85
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726, 733 (1995).
328. See Nourse, supra note 23, at 1339.
329. Id. at 1379.
330. See Kenneth W. Simmons, The Relevance of Community Values to Just Deserts:
Criminal Law, Punishment Rationales, and Democracy, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635, 663–64
(2000) (noting that community values are embedded into provocation’s reasonableness
inquiry).
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objectively unreasonable behavior and subsequently mitigate punishment.
This view aligns with a basic tenet of the criminal law, which aims to punish
only actors who deviate from shared societal norms and expectations about
proper behavior.331
There is a consensus among commentators that the provocation defense
calls for normatively based determinations.332 Professors Dan Kahan and
Martha Nussbaum’s seminal work on the evaluative conception of emotions
in criminal law distinguishes between a mechanistic and an evaluative
conception of emotions in criminal law, advocating for the latter position.333
The loss of self-control theory, they continue, rests on a mechanistic
understanding of the emotions.334 Instead, Kahan and Nussbaum place a
premium on a normative, value-based evaluation of emotions by stressing the
significance of actors’ motives for engaging in criminal behaviors.335 Kahan
and Nussbaum’s evaluative conception of emotions recognizes that provoked
defendants’ actions express an appropriate valuation of the good that is
threatened by the deceased’s wrongful provocation.336
Additionally, considering whether provocation law should adopt broader
mitigating standards, Professor Stephen Morse points out that the scope of
the provocation doctrine embodies normative questions and that determining
which cases of impaired rationality are excusable reflect “a socially based
evaluative judgment that some rationality diminutions . . . are not the
defendant’s fault.”337 But commentators do not fully elaborate on the
specific content of provocation’s normative dimension, as the prevailing
view today is that rigid rules should not dictate what circumstances amount
to “adequate” provocation, instead leaving the jury to decide these questions
on a case-by-case basis.338 This view represents a conceptual shift from
common law where “adequacy” was limited to cover only predefined
categories embodying the deceased’s wrongdoing evaluated against social
norms that hinged on violation of male honor according to archaic values and
prevalent mores of that time.339 After courts recognized that these categories

331. See generally Saira Mohamed, Deviance, Aspiration, and the Stories We Tell:
Reconciling Mass Atrocity and the Criminal Law, 124 YALE L.J. 1628, 1634 (2015).
332. See, e.g., Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 56, at 307–10 (suggesting that provocation
law embodies an evaluative view of emotions, namely, it expresses a view on which emotional
responses to provocation are morally warranted, with the jury assessing emotions against the
background of community mores); see also LEE, supra note 118, at 235–36 (advocating a
normative reasonableness standard rather than merely positivist reasonableness); PILLSBURY,
supra note 313, at 147–55 (noting that provocation law’s emphasis on determining the
“adequacy” of the provocation through the lens of the ordinary person masks the normative
assumptions behind these assessments).
333. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 56, at 275–301.
334. Id. at 322.
335. Id. at 315–18.
336. Id. at 315.
337. Morse, supra note 35, at 300; see also Morse, supra note 194, at 196, 205 (noting that
“it’s all normativity, all the way down”).
338. DRESSLER, supra note 45, at 532.
339. See JEREMY HORDER, PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 186–97 (1992).

1864

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

were too narrow, they rejected fixed rules in favor of flexible and fluid
standards that juries need to apply.
While the advantages of replacing set rules with elastic standards cannot
be ignored, there are also downsides to consider. Since adequacy is a vague
and overly broad concept, its application risks inconsistencies across the
board in outcomes of provocation claims.340 While indeterminate concepts
like adequacy must rely on objective measures for evaluating defendants’
behavior, existing laws fall short of filling this abstract term with concrete
substance. The removal of rules created a lacuna after juries were left
without guiding principles on how to apply the amorphous adequacy concept,
as they were not provided with alternative standards to direct their evaluative
conclusions. Consequently, juries are forced to rely on their own moral
intuitions in deciding whether provocation is adequate. But communities
differ on shared moral values, which risks juries applying their personal
moral intuitions inconsistently in deciding this question. If, rather than
making normative and objective determinations based on critical morality,
juries relied on subjective and positive morality, the result might be
detrimental to both defendants and victims.341
Recognizing these difficulties by no means suggests that juries should not
engage in normative inquiries in evaluating provocation’s adequacy. Juries’
key role, beyond the obvious task of fact-finding, is to decide complex
normative questions.342 This mission is especially salient in considering
criminal defenses where juries are the best-suited institutional actors for
capturing societal norms and shared moral values regarding criminal
wrongdoing.343 But to assist juries in making normative evaluations
concerning provocation’s adequacy, I advocate the addition of a key
component that draws on the idea of contributory responsibility by making
the deceased’s wrongful act an element of provocation.344 Currently, no
provocation formulation explicitly makes the deceased’s criminally wrongful
act an element of the defense.345 While some jurisdictions require, in broad
terms, “provocation by the victim,” no statutory language unequivocally
340. See Nourse, supra note 23, at 1341–42 (noting the many inconsistencies in the
application of provocation claims).
341. See Jeremy Waldron, Particular Values and Critical Morality, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 561,
585–86 (1989).
342. See generally Mark P. Gergen, The Jury’s Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the
American Common Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 407 (1999) (discussing the role of juries’
normative determinations in tort and contract law).
343. See generally Youngjae Lee, The Criminal Jury, Moral Judgments, and Political
Representation, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1255.
344. For an explanation of the borrowed term “contributory responsibility” from Professor
Heidi M. Hurd, see generally Heidi M. Hurd, Blaming the Victim: A Response to the Proposal
That Criminal Law Recognize a General Defense of Contributory Responsibility, 8 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 503 (2005).
345. In some jurisdictions, only provocation by the victim, as opposed to third parties, is
considered in determining whether adequate provocation exists. See, e.g., State v. Turgeon,
676 A.2d 339, 341–42 (Vt. 1996); see also Aya Gruber, Victim Wrongs: The Case for a
General Criminal Defense Based on Wrongful Victim Behavior in an Era of Victims’ Rights,
76 TEMP. L. REV. 645, 685–86 (2003).

2020]

DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES AND PROVACATION

1865

provides that provocation is adequate only if it stems from the deceased’s
legally wrongful act.346
In recent years, commentators have weighed in on the idea of
incorporating the deceased’s wrongdoing into the provocation defense.
Requiring that the defendant and the deceased stand on equal moral footing,
Professor Victoria Nourse contends that manslaughter instructions should
only be given in cases where defendants react to a grave wrong that the law
otherwise punishes, denying such instructions to defendants who react in
response to the victim’s lawful conduct.347 Evaluating the defendant’s
reaction vis-à-vis the deceased’s wrongful behavior is precisely what makes
the defendant’s behavior understandable, even if not fully excused.348
Professor Aya Gruber draws on the idea of relational wrongdoing,
advocating a general defense based on the victim’s contributory liability for
Professor Vera Bergelson introduces the notion of
the crime.349
conditionality of rights to suggest that the deceased’s contribution to the
offense ought to matter for the provocation defense.350 Other commentators
disagree with the idea of considering the deceased’s wrongdoing, claiming
that it is both under- and overinclusive.351
Drawing on these proposals, I suggest that the deceased’s wrongful act
ought to be one piece of provocation’s normative dimension. To be clear,
introducing evidence that the deceased committed a wrongful act against the
defendant by no means suggests fully litigating the deceased’s precise role in
the homicide, including deciding whether such act was indeed committed
according to evidentiary standards applicable in criminal proceedings.
Granted, such determinations are neither practically possible given that the
deceased cannot testify nor normatively warranted given that the law cannot
hold the deceased criminally accountable. Instead, I posit that the wrongful
act element may be proven if defendants introduce evidence that the
deceased’s provoking behavior caused them to reasonably believe that the
deceased committed a legally wrongful act against them.352 Incorporating
defendants’ beliefs that the deceased had criminally wronged them does not
mean that the test is purely subjective, resting on defendants’ thoughts alone.
Rather, the jury will decide whether, under defendants’ specific
346. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1101(4), 13-1103(A)(2) (2020) (establishing
adequate provocation “by the victim”).
347. See Nourse, supra note 23, at 1396 (noting that women who end romantic
relationships commit no wrongdoing).
348. Id. at 1338, 1384, 1394.
349. See Gruber, supra note 345, at 681–82 (suggesting that provocation law should focus
on whether the victim’s behavior is wrongful enough to partially excuse the defendant’s
behavior).
350. See VERA BERGELSON, VICTIMS’ RIGHTS, VICTIMS’ WRONGS: COMPARATIVE
LIABILITY IN CRIMINAL LAW 32 (2009) (suggesting that the conditionality of rights should be
a guiding principle to determine circumstances where the deceased’s wrongdoing matters).
351. See Hurd, supra note 344, at 508–09.
352. This qualification is also aimed at ensuring that the provocation defense is not
underinclusive in that it would allow a defendant to raise the defense in cases involving
“misdirected retaliation” where defendants kills innocent bystanders mistakenly believing
they provoked him. An elaboration on this topic exceeds the scope of this Article.
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predicaments, taking into account the surrounding circumstances and the
objective characteristics of both parties, defendants reasonably believed that
the deceased legally wronged them.
Some readers might balk at the thought of linking provocation’s adequacy
to the deceased’s wrongdoing. Arguably, attributing blame to dead victims
is problematic given that their account is missing at trial. This concern may
be alleviated where other witnesses can shed light on the deceased’s conduct
preceding the killing. A more disconcerting difficulty is that taking the
deceased’s wrongdoing into consideration is incompatible with the criminal
justice system’s rejection of constructs that attribute blame to victims by
suggesting that they partially contributed to the crime.353
Conceding that adding a wrongful act requirement to provocation’s
elements exacts a certain toll, a cost-benefit analysis suggests that the likely
benefits of such addition offset its costs. Incorporating this requirement
would not only provide juries with much-needed guidance for evaluating
provocation’s adequacy but also supplement their assessment with the
missing normative component. The wrongdoing requirement aligns with the
underlying rationale behind the provocation defense, namely, that mitigation
is warranted because provoked killers are less morally culpable than
unprovoked killers.354 The deceased’s wrongful act is a crucial element that
explains why some defendants who experienced impaired judgment deserve
reduced penalty while others do not. Many defendants commit crimes while
experiencing impaired judgment, yet neither law nor accepted societal values
supports mitigation.355 What makes provoked killers deserving of mitigation
is the fact that they share at least some of the blame with the deceased. It is
the deceased’s wrongful act that gives them a justifiable sense of being
wronged, according to shared community norms, values, and moral
standards.356 Adding a wrongful act requirement thus supplies the moral
basis for mitigation because it explains why the defendant had legitimate
grounds for feeling legally wronged by the deceased’s provoking behavior.
Further, making the deceased’s wrongdoing an element of provocation
does not suggest that the homicide is justified, as accepting a provocation
claim only partially excuses defendants.357 The wrongful act requirement
embraces a societal norm of relational responsibility that rests on the idea
that the defendant’s moral culpability is relative rather than absolute, and it
is determined in relation to that of the deceased’s. The deceased’s relative
contribution to the lethal event, combined with the defendant’s reduced
353. See Vera Bergelson, Victims and Perpetrators: An Argument for Comparative
Liability in Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 385, 397 (2005) (“Criminal law . . . has
explicitly rejected the idea of contributory fault.”).
354. See Daniel Givelber, The New Law of Murder, 69 IND. L.J. 375, 382 (1994).
355. The paradigm example involves heavily intoxicated defendants whose rationality was
significantly impaired as a result of heavy consumption of drugs, alcohol, or their
combination.
356. See Nourse, supra note 23, at 1338, 1404–05.
357. See Berman & Farrell, supra note 76, at 1065 (arguing that provocation is both a
partial justification and a partial excuse). An elaboration on whether provocation is a partial
excuse or a partial justification is not needed for my arguments here.
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moral culpability, draws a normative line between reasons for killings that
society is willing to understand and those that it is not. It makes the
defendant’s lethal reaction somehow understandable—albeit unjustified—in
communities’ eyes because the defendant is perceived as someone who
overreacted to the deceased’s wrongful act.
Adding a wrongful act element also mitigates possible concerns that some
readers are likely to raise, including that reliance on broad dual-process
theories overstretches the scope of an already expansive and controversial
defense, resulting in unwarranted leniency towards dangerous defendants.
Grounding a criminal defense on these theories may risk flooding the gates
with questionable psychological testimony aimed at bolstering a host of
dubious defenses, including the “abuse excuse” and other scientifically
suspect “syndromes.”358 These concerns are overstated for several reasons.
First, unlike self-defense, accepting a provocation claim does not lead to full
acquittal of any crime but instead only mitigates the conviction from murder
to manslaughter, which carries a reduced, yet still hefty sentence. Second,
broadening the doctrinal scope of the provocation defense would not lead to
the acceptance of all such defensive claims as juries are free to reject them
on factual grounds. Finally, while dual-process theories enlarge the doctrinal
basis for the provocation defense, adding the wrongful act element offers a
limiting mechanism that counteracts the effect of expansion. Reemphasizing
the role of provocation’s normative dimension alleviates any worries that
reliance on dual-process theories might result in the massive acceptance of
provocation claims. The reconstructed defense envisioned here ought to be
reserved for aberrational situations in which defendants overreacted to
exceptional circumstances caused by the deceased’s criminal wrongdoing.
The main implication of adding the constraint of a wrongful act
requirement is that juries would be instructed that the deceased may not be
deemed to have committed a wrongful act if they engaged in conduct that
they had a legal right to pursue. One notable example in which such
requirement would limit the scope of the provocation defense concerns
defendants who killed intimate partners who wanted to terminate the
relationship and claimed that their partners’ behavior provoked them to
kill.359 Under contemporary societal norms, any party to an intimate
relationship may exercise the legal right to end it, for whatever reason.360
Therefore, the deceased would not be deemed to have committed a wrongful
act in these circumstances, barring the defendant’s provocation claim. Since
provocation’s objective inquiry precedes the subjective one, establishing the
deceased’s wrongful act would become a prerequisite for considering the

358. See Christopher Slobogin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Trials: To Junk or Not
to Junk?, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 2 (1998) (explaining the term “abuse excuse,” defined
by Alan Dershowitz, as the legal tactic used by criminal defendants to claim a history of abuse
as an excuse for violent retaliation).
359. See Nourse, supra note 23, at 1332.
360. Id. at 1407–08.
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subjective test.361 Excluding the subjective inquiry for defendants who did
not kill in response to wrongdoing on the deceased’s part further sharpens
the normatively based assessments at the heart of the provocation defense. It
sends an expressive message that society is willing to understand, at least
partially, a defendant’s overreaction to the deceased’s provoking behavior
only when it was caused by the deceased’s legal wrongdoing. Put differently,
while defendants’ overreaction to certain emotional experiences, like anger
and fear, may not be fully justified or excused, it may nonetheless be
perceived as an understandable reaction, given the circumstances that
defendants were facing.
Moreover, as previously mentioned, commentators extensively criticize
the gender-based dimension embedded in provocation claims, which
arguably allow angry males who kill female partners to receive a jury
instruction on manslaughter but deny such an instruction for fearful women
who kill abusive partners.362 The position advocated here aims to dismantle
provocation’s gender-based concerns by adopting a gender-neutral approach
to the defense. Killing because of anger, possessiveness, and jealously
should never be partially excused regardless of the defendant’s gender
because there is no wrongful act on the deceased’s part, regardless of gender.
Consequently, this approach would deny recognition of a provocation claim
to female defendants who kill out of anger, absent any criminal wrongdoing
by the deceased male.363 But it would also allow male defendants to prevail
on provocation grounds if they killed a female who committed a wrongful
act.364
Making the deceased’s wrongdoing an element of the provocation defense
calls for both a modification and a clarification. First, this element ought to
include not only a single wrongful act but also multiple wrongful acts in order
to reflect the reality that provoked killers often react to a series of acts by the
361. See, e.g., State v. Braden, 785 N.E.2d 439, 455 (Ohio 2003) (deciding the objective
prong first).
362. See Forell, supra note 130, at 3–4.
363. See, e.g., State v. McClain, 591 A.2d 652, 656 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). The
court upheld the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter where the
defendant killed her boyfriend after being angry at him for years of cheating on her. Id. The
court held that the evidence did not support the objective test requiring that a reasonable person
would have lost control. Id.
364. State v. Swihart, No. 2-CA-CR 2010-0136, 2011 WL 5506098, at *1, *3 (Ariz. Ct.
App. Nov. 10, 2011). The court upheld the jury instructions on the provocation defense in a
case where the male defendant and the deceased, his female girlfriend, became intoxicated
and commenced a verbal confrontation that turned into a physical fight, in which both parties
equally participated. Id. The deceased turned over furniture and broke items in the defendant’s
apartment and both the defendant and the deceased were striking each other. Id. The defendant
and the deceased exchanged multiple threatening text messages, including one in which the
deceased said that she had people “on the way” to kill the defendant. Id. The deceased then
left the defendant’s apartment but returned to it later. Id. Shortly after, the defendant’s
roommate found the deceased shot while the defendant was on his knees screaming. Id. After
the deceased died from a single gunshot wound to her chest, the defendant was charged with
murder but the jury convicted him of manslaughter, likely accepting the defendant’s theory
that the deceased’s wrongful acts, including physical confrontation and threatening text
messages, provoked him to kill her. Id.
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deceased that might have been committed over an extended period of time.365
Consider Part II’s discussion of cumulative provocation, which is especially
salient in cases involving domestically abused defendants who endured
multiple incidents of physical abuse by the deceased.366 In these
circumstances, defendants’ actions are triggered not solely by the last abusive
incident but by the cumulative effect of the deceased’s various wrongful
acts.367
Second, the wrongful act requirement must include the deceased’s verbal
threats to inflict serious physical harm on the defendant. Since many
jurisdictions retain the traditional rule that “words alone” do not amount to
provocation, the deceased’s threats might not be sufficient to meet the
wrongful act requirement.368 Provocation’s wrongful act element must
include an explicit verbal threat of physical harm to cover situations where
defendants appear to overreact to the deceased’s threats but fall short of a
right to self-defense because the threats were not sufficiently imminent.369
An imminence requirement is especially problematic in cases where
defendants were subjected to prolonged physical domestic abuse but killed
their abusers at a moment when physical confrontation was absent.370 These
defendants overreact to threats that are not objectively imminent, yet they
misperceive the threat and overestimate its magnitude and proximity because
of their impaired judgment.371 Recognizing provocation claims in these
cases is therefore appropriate from the perspective of sound public policy.
C. A Test Case
The facts underlying the 2015 Kansas Supreme Court decision in State v.
Brownlee372 may serve as a test case for applying the reformulated
provocation doctrine advocated above that rests on the theory of impaired
judgment. In this case, a male defendant shot and killed a man following a
verbal argument that deteriorated into physical confrontation stemming from
the deceased’s touching the defendant’s sister in a sexual manner without her
consent.373 The trial court refused to instruct the jury on voluntary
manslaughter, resulting in the defendant’s murder conviction.374 Upholding
365. See, e.g., State v. Vogel, 85 P.3d 497, 498 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
366. See supra Part II.B.
367. See, e.g., State v. Tierney, 813 A.2d 560, 568 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (noting
that a prolonged course of physical abuse by the deceased that the defendant reasonably
believed would continue might be considered adequate provocation).
368. See, e.g., State v. Rambo, 951 A.2d 1075, 1081 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008)
(quoting State v. Castagna, 870 A.2d 653, 675 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)) (explaining
that threats to kill and burn the house down are “words alone” and thus insufficient for
provocation).
369. Vogel, 85 P.3d at 502.
370. See Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense, Not
Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211, 284 (2002).
371. See supra Part III.B.
372. 354 P.3d 525 (Kan. 2015).
373. Id. at 542.
374. Id. at 534–35.
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the conviction, the Kansas Supreme Court held that a voluntary manslaughter
instruction was not factually appropriate.375 The court reasoned that the
evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant had lost self-control or
acted out of passion.376 There was no sudden quarrel between the defendant
and the deceased, rather the dispute between them merely “simmered”
throughout the evening.377
Brownlee supports my contention that the loss of self-control theory is
underinclusive, resulting in the provocation defense being too narrowly
construed. To instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, Kansas law
requires evidence of provocation that “cause[s] an ordinary man to lose
control of his actions and his reason.”378 The loss of self-control theory plays
a critical part in the court’s problematic interpretation of provocation’s
elements. The court placed a heavy premium on the fact that the defendant
visibly appeared composed during the events that led to the shooting, trying
to calm other partygoers and diffuse tensions with the deceased.379 This view
not only downplayed the defendant’s emotional arousal but also
underestimated the significance of the physical confrontation with the
deceased. The court further emphasized the requirement that, for adequate
provocation, the quarrel must be sudden and rejected the view that the
defendant experienced cumulative provocation, which gradually simmered
over the course of the evening.380
Hypothetically, applying the proposed impaired judgment framework to
Brownlee would have likely resulted in a jury instruction on voluntary
manslaughter. The facts of the case demonstrate that both the objective and
subjective elements of the proposed provocation defense could have been
met. Beginning with the question of the deceased’s legal wrongdoing, the
evidence shows that it was the deceased’s wrongful act that provoked the
defendant. Witness testimony established that the deceased was threatening
both the defendant’s sister and the defendant himself. They testified that the
deceased sexually touched the defendant’s sister and, when her boyfriend
confronted him, the deceased responded with the threat: “I’ll smack you . . .
and your bitch.”381 Witnesses further testified that the deceased also
threatened that he would “snatch little n—s’ guns and beat ’em with it” and
that he would be back later to hurt the defendant.382 These statements not
only constitute criminal offenses, namely concrete threats to inflict physical
375. Id. at 542. Two justices dissented from the majority’s decision, holding that the jury
should have been instructed on voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 548, 551 (Luckert, J.,
dissenting).
376. Id. at 542 (majority opinion).
377. Id. (providing additional reasons for rejecting a voluntary manslaughter jury
instruction, including that the defendant’s sister and her boyfriend were provoked, the
defendant was just a third party, and the case involved mere words which are not considered
adequate provocation).
378. Id. at 541 (quoting State v. Hayes, 327 P.3d 414, 418 (Kan. 2014)).
379. Id. at 542.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id.
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harm, but also go over and above mere words, which, under Kansas law, do
not amount to provocation.383
Additionally, the evidence supports the conclusion that a jury could have
reasonably concluded that the defendant’s judgment was impaired as a result
of both the physical confrontation between him and the deceased and the
deceased’s threatening statements. The evidence shows that immediately
prior to the shooting, when the defendant was confronted by the deceased
outside the house, the initial verbal confrontation between the defendant and
the deceased escalated into a physical one. Several witnesses testified that
the shooting was the culmination of an angry altercation between the
deceased and the defendant. One witness testified that it was the deceased
who initiated the physical altercation, telling the defendant that he wanted to
fight.384 Given these testimonies, a broader view of provocation, one that
rests on impaired judgment theory, could have led a jury to conclude that the
defendant shot the deceased as a result of intense emotional arousal that
impaired his judgment, that it was triggered by the deceased’s wrongful act,
and that it would have likely provoked any ordinary person in these
circumstances.
CONCLUSION
Mildred Hayes, the protagonist in the film Three Billboards Outside
Ebbing, Missouri is portrayed not only as an incredibly angry woman but
also as a deeply grieving victim.385 Admittedly, she has objectively sound
reasons for experiencing rage and sorrow. Hayes is the indirect victim of
heinous crimes perpetrated against her teenage daughter, who was raped and
murdered and her killer was never found. Hayes’s fury and frustration with
the town’s police chief leads her to pay for three billboards in which she
blames him for failing to bring the perpetrator to justice. The film depicts
the transformation that Hayes undergoes from a desperate, sad, and angry
victim to a ruthless villain, perpetrating a series of violent crimes. While she
is initially perceived as a sympathetic victim who expresses understandable
anger, as the plot unfolds, her character transforms into an unhinged, raging
woman seeking vengeance. The film nowhere portrays Hayes as someone
who just “snapped” and lost self-control. Instead, her actions seemingly
express agency and autonomy as she retains her composure, appearing cool
and carefully calculating violent actions, including a plan for a revenge
killing.

383. State v. Hayes, 327 P.3d 414, 418–19 (Kan. 2014) (holding that “mere words or
gestures . . . do not constitute legally sufficient provocation”); State v. Johnson, 236 P.3d 517,
523 (Kan. 2010) (defining quarrel to include the exchange of threats between two persons).
384. Brownlee, 354 P.3d at 551 (Luckert, J., dissenting).
385. Inkoo Kang, Three Billboards Centers Female Vengeance, but It’s Really About the
Salvation of Men, SLATE (Dec. 5, 2017, 8:33 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/browbeat/
2017/12/05/three_billboards_female_vengance_misses_the_weinstein_moment.html
[https://perma.cc/C22M-SHCF].
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This construction of societal perceptions, which draws on an essentialist
account about gender identities, is not unique to film.386 The criminal justice
system is similarly keen on embracing an essentialist narrative of female
perpetrators by taking a binary approach under which women killers may
either act out of fear, overreacting to what they perceive as defending
themselves against imminent deadly attacks, or alternatively as mentally
deranged, crazy, or unhinged women.387 The “angry woman” is a notion that
the justice system has difficulty grappling with.388
This Article reveals the various implications that the loss of self-control
theory carries for different types of provoked killers. It shows that this theory
mostly accommodates the typical reactions of angry perpetrators but fails to
account for violent actions that are triggered by a host of other emotions. For
actors who maintain self-control, whose behaviors do not align with societal
expectations of how provoked killers normally react, the criminal justice
system carries especially harsh consequences because it views them as
calculating, vengeful murderers.
This Article thus aims to illuminate the flaws of essentialism as they are
reflected in the provocation doctrine. It rejects an essentialist account of
provocation that cuts across gender lines, under which male defendants
necessarily lose self-control, acting out of anger, whereas female defendants
act out of fear, overreacting to nonimminent physical threats. As scholars
argue, essentialism about identities is usually wrong, and most groups of
people are defined by various social identities and are thus enormously
diverse.389 Instead of relying on the familiar dichotomies that underlie
provocation, this Article urges a gender-neutral view of provoked killers,
acknowledging that their violence is triggered by a myriad of intense
emotions over and above anger, including fear, grief, desperation,
hopelessness, or their combination. Under this account, women may be
provoked to kill out of anger while men may be provoked to kill out of fear.
Moreover, both males and females may kill out of mixed emotions and
combined motives.
By applying dual-process theories to better understand the provocation
defense, this Article offers a doctrinal framework that potentially alleviates
some of the harsh consequences stemming from mandatory minimum
sentencing laws for murder convictions, including their disproportional
effect on racial minorities.390 Additionally, the notion of impaired judgment
is sufficiently capacious to cover a broad range of circumstances in which a
386. See Susan Gelman, Psychological Essentialism in Children, 8 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI.
404, 404 (2004) (defining essentialism as “the view that certain categories have an underlying
reality or true nature that one cannot observe directly but that gives an object its identity, and
is responsible for other similarities that category members share”).
387. See Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6 (1994).
388. See generally Jessica J. Salerno et al., Closing with Emotion: The Differential Impact
of Male Versus Female Attorneys Expressing Anger in Court, 42 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 385,
387–88 (2018).
389. See KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE LIES THAT BIND: RETHINKING IDENTITY 29
(2018).
390. See Gruber, supra note 89, at 325.
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variety of emotions beyond anger provoke violent reactions. This suggestion
leaves many open questions for future work, including, among others,
whether the impaired judgment construct might allow mitigation for
defendants who kill out of mercy and compassion.391 But this Article also
illuminates the need to place normative limits on the scope of mitigation in
order to conform with sound public policy considerations. It acknowledges
that dual-process theories are only able to provide a partial promise for
reshaping provocation doctrine and that, at the end of the day, normativity
governs, as no civilized society is willing to offer leniency to all individuals
whose judgment was impaired due to overwhelming emotions. Society’s
readiness to mitigate murder charges hinges on moral principles
encompassing contemporary shared community values. Rethinking the
moral basis for provocation thus demands that the doctrine rest on moral
judgments, confirming societal views about which types of killings are less
morally blameworthy than murder.

391. See Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Compassionate Homicide, 98 WASH. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming Aug. 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3537967
[https://perma.cc/AN78-RZFW] (proposing a new partial excuse, grounded in the emotion of
compassion, that would reduce the grade of the homicide in cases where actors killed loved
family members out of compassion for the victims); see also R. A. Duff, Criminal
Responsibility and the Emotions: If Fear and Anger Can Exculpate, Why Not Compassion?,
58 INQUIRY 189 (2015) (considering the role of compassion as a basis for mitigating actors’
criminal liability in the context of assisted suicide).

